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Certification is a state statutory device that allows interested state courts to
answer questions of their own state law where no controlling precedent exists.'
The statute may make certification available in both federal diversity cases2 and
in the state-to-state context.3 In 1967, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, together with the American Bar Association, proposed
the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act ("U.L.A." or "the Act")
to promote uniformity and consistency in the administration of the certification
process between courts. 4 The U.L.A. long ago achieved widespread acceptance
in federal diversity cases;5 in this context, the process resolves many of the
problems associated with the Erie doctrine. 6 On the other hand, courts utterly
1. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967) (furnishing
provision giving state high court power to answer certified questions that may be determinative of
cause pending in certifying court).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) (providing for federal subject-matter jurisdiction over suits between
citizens of different states); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (allowing for federal subject-matter jurisdiction
over suits involving federal question).
3. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 8, 12 U.L.A. 55 (1967) (providing for
state-to-state certification in conflict-of-laws situations). The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association proposed the U.L.A. See Unif. Certification
of Questions of Law Act, historical note, 12 U.L.A. 49 (1975).
4. Id. Commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 49, 51 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. v. Shifflet, 370 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir. 1967) (granting certification
request after Florida Supreme Court gave misrepresentation statute different interpretation from that
given by federal court in prior case); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 358 F.2d 347, 347 (5th
Cir. 1966) (certifying question regarding whether Florida courts would apply Illinois wrongful-death
statute); Greene v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 86 (5th Cir. 1962) (ordering certification on
rehearing to determine if Florida law imposed absolute liability for breach of warranty).
6. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 49-
51 (1975) (finding certification as more rapid method of solving Erie problems than abstention
doctrine). See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring federal courts in nonfederal
matters to follow substantive state law); see also Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941) (holding that federal courts may abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases involving
state law).
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fail to use the certification process in the state-to-state context to alleviate many
of the procedural burdens stemming from difficult and confusing choice-of-law
problems. 7 Moreover, while many states have adopted substantial portions of the
U.L.A., each state either omitted or expanded upon provisions of the Act, 9
thwarting the commendable goals of uniformity and interstate certification.10
This article addresses the merits of certification and encourages universal
enactment of a new and improved U.L.A." The proposed Act seeks to surpass
the U.L.A. by establishing mandatory uniform legislation, thereby creating con-
sistency among state-certification procedures. This new uniformity should further
the goals of comity and expedience while simultaneously making both interstate
and federal-diversity certification more accessible. In part the proposed legislation
seeks to accomplish these tasks by mandating that equivalent state courts be the
only ones with the power to certify and answer such questions. 2 The proposed
Act also requires consistency in the types of questions certified and answered, as
well as in the time limits for responding. 3 With newly enforced uniformity, the
benefits of both interstate and federal-to-state certification - such as judicial
economy, removal of guesswork by judges, and comity between states - will be
more fully realized than under the current patchwork system.
Part I of the article reviews both the history of certification and the concerns
that the U.L.A. sought to address. Part II presents a detailed analysis of various
provisions of the U.L.A. Part III discusses enactment of the U.L.A., either by
statute or by court rule. In Part IV, I address state variations in certification
laws, highlighting some of the different provisions permitted and how this affects
certification for those states. In Part V, I present an analysis of the actual
operation of certification procedure. Part VI contains a discussion of some of
the problems encountered in the enactment of a certification statute, using as
illustrations the experiences of New York and Connecticut. Finally, in Part VII,
I propose a revised interjurisdictional-certification statute, with provisions to
encourage uniformity and ease of application, in the hope of stimulating the
greater use of certification in the interstate context, in order to eliminate thorny
problems of conflict of laws. The article concludes that adoption of the proposed
U.L.A. will solve such problems, but only if the provisions of the U.L.A. are
made mandatory.
7. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 51
(1975).
8. See infra Appendix part B.
9. See infra notes 283-316 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of U.L.A. and how
different states have adopted variations on U.L.A., including assorted standards for certification,
allowing courts to certify to other states, and allowing receipt of certified questions from different
sources).
10. For general discussions of certification, see John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional
Certification and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411 (1988) (discussing arguments for and against
certification and concluding with empirical study of state and federal judges); Larry M. Roth,
Certified Questions from the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. I (1979)
(discussing certification in the federal-to-state context); Allan D. Vestal, The Certified Question of
Law, 36 IowA L. REV. 629 (1951) (presenting pre-U.L.A. views on certification).
11. See infra notes 423-58 and accompanying text (detailing proposed uniform certification
statute).
12. See infra notes 426-32 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 434-40 and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF
LAW ACT
A. Origins of Interjurisdictional Certification
The procedural device of certification allows the certifying court to obtain
an answer to a difficult, previously unaddressed question of law, or to a question
of law with no controlling precedent.' 4 These questions typically arise when a
court must decide a case before it on the basis of the law of another jurisdiction.
Specifically, the certifying court presents the question to the court that is best
suited to answer the question, or to a higher court within the same jurisdiction. 5
In the past, however, different jurisdictions in both the United States and Britain
have adopted disparate forms of this procedural device.' 6 The promulgation of
divergent acts and rules limited the use and thwarted the development of the
certification process. 17 The current U.L.A. attempts to unify the various certifi-
cation processes in order to create consistency of application irrespective of the
certifying or answering court. 8
1. Intrajurisdictional Certification
Approximately half of the states of the United States permit certification
from an inferior state court to the highest court of the same state to resolve a
question of law on a particular point. 9 This form of intrajurisdictional certifi-
cation, within the closed state judicial system, contrasts with the interjurisdictional
certification concept embodied in the U.L.A.20 Generally, in state intrajurisdic-
tional certification, the inferior court within the jurisdiction controls the procedure
by formulating the question or questions posed,2' determining what portions of
the record must be sent to the higher court, and setting forth the relevant facts.
22
The case itself remains in the certifying court, which becomes bound to follow
the law presented in the answer given by the higher (answering) court. 23 Further,
the higher court usually has discretion whether to answer the certified question,
14. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
15. See id. (providing for interjurisdictional certification to answer questions of law); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(3) (1988).
16. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1945) (allowing interjurisdictional certification and
amending FLA. App. R. 9.150 and 4.61); British Law Ascertainment Act, 22 & 23 Vict., 1859, ch.
63 (Eng.) (permitting court to remit case to another court to answer question of law).
17. See infra note 441 and accompanying text (proposing reciprocity provision in uniform statute).
18. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 49,
51 (1975).
19. Allan D. Vestal, Transcript of Proceedings of Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM CERTIFICATION
OF QUESTIONS OF LAW Act 3 (Aug. 3, 1966) and (Aug. 1, 1967) [hereinafter Transcript of 1966 or
Transcript of 1967]. States with an intrajurisdictional certification procedure include Alabama,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia and Wyoming.
See Appendix part B. See also Vestal, supra note 10, at 631.
20. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 8, 12 U.L.A. 55 (1967) (recommending
certification in both the federal-to-state and the state-to-state contexts).
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and acts only on the questions posed,24 thereby leaving the ultimate ruling in the
case to the lower court.23
The federal system also permits a form of intrajurisdictional certification. 26
Both the United States Claims Court and the federal courts of appeals may
certify questions of law to the United States Supreme Court. 27 As in the state
hierarchical system, both the decision to certify and the decision to answer are
discretionary. 28 A lower court properly invokes certification when it cannot
determine the rule of law relevant to the certified question or does not wish to
venture a guess, educated or otherwise.2 9 The U.L.A. mirrors these principles in
its text.3 0 While this article examines the viability of these principles, its focus
on the U.L.A. pertains more specifically to interjurisdictional certification in the
state-to-state context.
2. Interjurisdictional Certification
The concept and use of interjurisdictional certification developed relatively
recently in American jurisprudence.3 Prior to formulation of the U.L.A., some
scholarly work had been done in the area, primarily by Allan Vestal, then
Professor of Law at the University of Iowa and one of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.32 This early research and thinking formed the basis for
many of the policies ultimately realized in the U.L.A.3 Professor Vestal's
contribution to the development of the contemporary certification process, along
with that of other academicians, cannot be underestimated.
The British experience provided one of the sources for their ideas on
interjurisdictional certification and suggested methods for implementing such a
system in the United States.34 Under both international and interstate conflict-
24. Id.
25. Id.; see also Note, Interjurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative
Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 344, 349 n.40 (1963) (providing state statutory authority for
federal interjurisdictional certification).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988).
27. Id.; Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A.
49 (1975).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988); Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners'
prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 52-53 (1975).
29. Note, supra note 25, at 348.
30. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 52-53
(1967).
31. CARROLL SERON, CERTIFYING QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW: EXPERIENCE OF FEDERAL JUDGES
(1983) (publication of the Federal Judicial Center, asserting that certification did not play an important
role in federal courts until 1974, when the Supreme Court held that certification may be used in
diversity cases). See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974) (finding that certification in federal-
to-state context does not raise constitutional issue).
32. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 1. Professor Vestal's writings prior to the adoption of
the U.L.A. include: James W. Moore & Allan D. Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification
in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1 (1949); Vestal, supra note 10. Other commentary
on certification includes: Comment, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of
Means and Confusion of Goals", 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964) [hereinafter Comment, Abstention and
Certification]; Comment, Certifying Questions to State Supreme Courts as a Remedy to the Abstention
Doctrine, 9 SAN DIEo L. REv. 158 (1974); Note, supra note 25; Note, Consequences of Abstention
by a Federal Court, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1358 (1960) [hereinafter Note, Consequences of Abstention].
33. See infra notes 99-258 and accompanying text (describing process and debates of Commis-
sioners formulating U.L.A.).
34. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A.
49 n.1 (1975) (noting that certification has long history in English-speaking world).
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of-laws doctrines, it often becomes necessary to discover and apply the law of a
foreign jurisdiction to determine the rights of the litigants in the forum. The
Uniform Law Commissioners vigorously debated ways to rectify this problem.35
For support for their ideas, the Commissioners looked to the British Law
Ascertainment Act of 1859 and the Foreign Law Ascertainment Act of 1861.36
The British Law Ascertainment Act of 1859 permitted a court in one part of the
British Commonwealth to remit a case for an opinion on a question of law to a
court in another part of the Commonwealth.3 7 The Foreign Law Ascertainment
Act of 1861 allowed questions of law to be certified between British courts and
courts of foreign countries, provided that each country had signed a convention
governing such procedure." The precepts of the U.L.A. find their basis in these
Acts.3 9 The conflict-of-laws provisions of both the U.L.A. and the British Acts
serve the same purpose: clarification of unclear nonforum law when necessary
to the resolution of a caseA0
Both British Acts provide that a statement of the facts, either agreed to by
the parties or set forth by the court, must accompany the certified question.
4'
35. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 9-10, 22. The original purpose of the U.L.A. was to
combat the Erie problem. Id. at 9-10; see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that
federal courts must apply state substantive law to state claims in federal-court cases based on diversity
jurisdiction). Many Commissioners felt that to go beyond that purpose by attempting to resolve
conflict-of-laws problems would impede passage in state legislatures, thereby undermining the Act's
intent. By the end of the 1966 meeting, the pertinent language of Section 1 read: "may answer
questions of law certified to it by. . . a United States District Court in this state [or the highest
appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of any other state] . Transcript of 1966,
supra note 19, at 9-10 (emphasis added).
With this language the Commissioners made the adoption of state-to-state certification optional
and eliminated the possibility of a federal district court of one state certifying a question to the
highest court of another state. Id. Thus, the conflict-of-laws problems often faced in court would
have no opportunity for resolution via certification. By 1967, the Commissioners decided to eliminate
the "in this state" limitation appended to the federal district court power to certify, but not the
constraint on interstate, certification. See Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 5-10, 18-20, 26.
36. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 49
n.1 (1975); see Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 867-68 n.84 (revealing that
Great Britain's statute on certification, akin to Florida statute on which U.L.A. is based, has a long
history, but stating that British version had met with mixed success). But cf. Vestal, supra note 10,
at 644 n.79 (citing Lord v. Caum, 1 Drew & Sm. 24, 26 (1860), in which court applied Act of
Ascertainment, as evidence of success of British statute).
37. British Law Ascertainment Act, 22 & 23, 1859, Vict., ch. 63 (Eng.) [hereinafter Act of
1859]. The provisions of this Act were extended to British territories, including Tanganyika, Kenya,
and Northern Rhodesia. Id.
38. Foreign Law Ascertainment Act, 24 & 25 Vict., 1861, ch. II (Eng.) [hereinafter Act of 1861].
The Act of 1861 was never used, because no such conventions were ever signed; it was finally repealed
in 1976. See Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1973 (Colonies) Order 1976 (SI 1976 No. 54). Despite the
fact that these Acts apparently met with little success, the basic principles provide a useful foundation
for the U.L.A. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' prefatory note, 12
U.L.A. 49 n.l (1975).
39. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing British Acts); see also Comment,
Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 868 n.84 (noting existence of British statutes, but
stating that they have met with little success); Vestal, supra note 10, at 643-44 (defending idea of
interjurisdictional certification with example of foreign certification treaties designed to resolve
conflict-of-laws problems). One British judge commented that courts would have had to guess at
Scottish law, probably with little chance of success, without the Act of 1859. See Vestal, supra note
10, at 644 n.79 (citing Lord v. Colvin, I Drew & Sm. 24, 26 (1860)).
40. Act of 1859, at ch. 63. The text provides: "an Act to afford Facilities for the more certain
Ascertainment of the Law administered in one Part of Her Majesty's Dominion when pleaded in the
Courts of another Part thereof." Id.
41. Id. at 1; Act of 1861, at 1.
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The Acts also mandate the binding nature of the opinion rendered by the
answering court, although the certifying court may resubmit the opinion to the
answering court "on any ground whatsoever" if that court doubts the accuracy
of the opinion.4 1 In contrast, an answering court in the United States receives
greater deference, because the U.L.A. refuses to allow for a remittitur to the
answering court.
43
Within the United States, four states - Florida, Hawaii, Maine, and
Washington - had adopted interjurisdictional certification procedures prior to
the promulgation of the U.L.A.M The Commissioners patterned the U.L.A.
largely on Florida Appellate Rule 4.61 (in addition to British law), as Florida
had enacted the first interjurisdictional procedure in the United States.4 5 Despite
the existence of this certification procedure in Florida since 1945 and Professor
Vestal's pioneering 1951 article 6 describing its benefits, the four state certification
statutes lay dormant until the Supreme Court authorized their use in Clay v. Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. 7 in 1960. Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court employed
the procedure in Aldrich v. Aldrich" and Dresner v. City of Tallahassee.4 1 In
these two cases, the Court certified questions of law to the Florida Supreme
Court.1S This action brought the certification procedure to the attention of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which used the Florida
statute in Green v. American Tobacco Co.,' Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft
42. Act of 1859, at § 4; Act of 1861, at 2. Section 4 of the Act of 1859 provides that, if an
appeal to the House of Lords or to Her Majesty in Council is requested, they may choose to reject
or accept the opinion as they see fit. Act of 1859, at § 4.
43. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (noting that, in United States, answering court
may rephrase question posed). See, e.g., Irion v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 199 (Mont. 1969)
(allowing court to rephrase question).
44. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1945) (amending FLA. App. R. 9.150 and 4.61); HAW. REv. STAT. ch.
214, §§ 26-27 (1955); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (West 1964) (amended by Rule 76 B.M.R.C.P.);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.60.020 (West Supp. 1975) (originally enacted at 1965 Wash. Laws, ch.
99, § 1).
45. Paragraph (a) of Florida Appellate Rule 9.150, amending Rule 4.61, reads:
Discretionary Proceedings to Review Certified Questions From Federal Courts.
(a) Applicability. Upon either its own motion or that of the party, the Supreme Court
of the United States or the United States Court of Appeals may certify a question of
law to the Supreme Court of Florida whenever the answer is determinative of the cause
and there is no controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida.
FLA. App. R. 9.150(a) (1945). Florida Chief Justice Leander J. Shaw, Jr., recently commented on
the success of Rule 9.150, calling it one of the "many examples of positive state/federal cooperation."
L. Shaw, Remarks at the 1991 Eleventh Circuit Judicial Conference (May 25, 1991), at 4.
46. Vestal, supra note 10.
47. 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (certifying questions involving state law to Florida Supreme Court to
avoid resolving constitutional issue). See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners'
prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 50 (1975). Hawaii's statute had not been used prior to Clay. Maine's and
Washington's statutes were adopted after Clay.
48. 375 U.S. 75 (1963) (certifying four questions to Florida Supreme Court in alimony case on
certiorari from West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals).
49. 375 U.S. 136 (1963) (certifying questions to Florida Supreme Court concerning issue of
Florida lower court power to review cases from state circuit court).
50. Dresner, 375 U.S. at 139; Aldrich, 375 U.S. at 77. Exactly why the Supreme Court authorized
the Fifth Circuit to certify the questions in Clay but certified the questions itself in Aldrich and
Dresner is unclear. Perhaps the Court thought that certifying the questions itself would save time
for the litigants.
51. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) (certifying questions to Florida Supreme Court regarding proper
construction of Florida law concerning whether absolute liability applied to manufacturer or producer
of cigarettes), certified question answered in 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943
(1964).
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Corp. ,52 and Life Insurance Co. v. Shifflet." Maine had also utilized the procedure
in In re Richards54 and Norton v. Benjamin" prior to the adoption of the U.L.A.
B. Benefits of Interjurisdictional Certification
Proponents of the certification process praise the system for promoting
judicial economy, comity, ease of application, fairness to the litigants, and most
importantly for avoiding judicial guesswork.16 These people also maintain that
as a practical matter certification allows the relevant jurisdiction to decide its
own law where no clear precedent exists to guide a foreign jurisdiction on the
applicable law.57 It is important to note, however, that these comments come
from federal and state judges in the context of federal-to-state certification.58
While federal-to-state certification addresses Erie problems, interstate certi-
fication too provides "a valuable device for securing prompt and authoritative
resolution of unsettled questions of state law, especially those that seem likely to
recur and to have significance beyond the interests of the parties in a particular
lawsuit."5 9 The certification process is necessary because it eliminates judicial
guesswork, and beneficial in that it advances justice and fairness.6 Twelve
jurisdictions have incorporated a state-to-state certification provision into their
certification laws. 6' The potential simplicity and ease of application of these laws
lends credence to the use of the certification method.
The Supreme Court's decision in Clay v. Sun Insurance, coupled with the
experience of the four states with previously enacted certification statutes, helped
to mold the outcome of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, held in 1966 and 1967.62 A draft of the U.L.A., prepared by Professor
52. 358 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966) (certifying questions of state law to Florida Supreme Court in
diversity case involving Florida's application of Illinois wrongful-death statute).
53. 370 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1967) (certifying questions to Florida Supreme Court concerning
proper construction of Florida Insurance Code).
54. 253 F. Supp. 913 (D. Me. 1966) (certifying questions of state law involving bankruptcy case
to Maine Supreme Judicial Court).
55. 220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966) (answering questions certified by federal district court regarding
whether release of liability in tort action is permissible under state law).
56. See generally Corr & Robbins, supra note 10 (discussing arguments for and against certifi-
cation, based in part on empirical study of judges).
57. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Vestal, supra note 10, at 640 (stating that "(t]he
judicious use of certification might be of real value in supplementing the work of the high court in
the establishment of a complete, well-articulated body of law for the state") (emphasis omitted); see
Independent School Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286, 298 (D. Minn. 1990)
(denying request for certification on ground that Minnesota law was sufficiently clear on issue for
federal court to satisfy Erie obligations although no case was precisely on point).
58. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 10, at 445.
59. Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., Inc., 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that certification
has been important tool).
60. See, e.g., National Cycle, Inc. v. Savoy Reinsurance Co., 938 F.2d 61, 64 (7th Cir. 1991)
("Certification eliminates the need to expend judicial resources predicting how another court will
decide a question."); Dickenson v. Townside T.V. & Appliance, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1122, 1132 n.8
(S.D. W. Va. 1990) (stating that, without certification, the court "would be left to decide the issue
based on its informed 'prediction' of how [the answering court] would have ruled had it accepted
such certification") Abraham S. Gafni, Certification to State Courts Stops Judicial "Guesswork",
10 PA. L.J. Rep. no. 48, at 3 (Dec. 21, 1987) (discussing general merits of certification process).
61. See infra note 286 (listing jurisdictions that allow interstate certification).
62. See generally Transcripts of 1966 and 1967, supra note 19 (discussing example set by state
statutes and decision in Clay as basis for U.L.A.).
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Vestal, was first presented and discussed in 1966.63 That draft highlighted three
major issues: (1) whether to allow for state-to-state certification; (2) which courts
should be able to certify a question of law to another state's supreme court; and
(3) whether the Act should take the form of a statute or a rule."
Chief Judge Charles Joiner of the Federal District Court of Michigan stated
the purpose of the Act as follows: to establish a "procedure whereby federal
and state courts can obtain at appropriate times and in an appropriate manner
a resolution of a significant problem of law of a state, to help the [certifying]
court resolve the problem before it.""61 At the time of the National Conference,
a federal court, in response to the dictates of the Erie" doctrine, had two options
when faced with unclear state law: it could abstain from hearing the state-law
claims, or it could try to predict the applicable state law.67 Exercising either of
these possibilities meant that the court chose between failure to decide an issue
before it and basing its decision on doctrine that was potentially at odds with
the very law it sought to apply.
The Act attempted to address the inadequacy of these alternatives by pro-
viding the federal court with a third option - certification. Certification simplified
and validated the procedure for determining the relevant state law, while pre-
serving the parties' right to a federal determination of the factual questions in
the suit.6 The extent to which conflict-of-laws problems could be resolved by
this process was only a secondary concern to the Commission. 69 The Commis-
sioners expected the Act to improve federal/state relations, 70 promote uniformity
in the law, 7' and more expeditiously resolve litigation that presented novel legal
63. See generally Transcript of 1966, supra note 19 (debating initial draft of U.L.A.).
64. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 7, 9.
65. Id. at 1.
66. See supra notes 6 & 35 (explaining that Erie doctrine forces federal courts in diversity-
jurisdiction cases to apply state substantive law).
67. Vestal, supra note 10, at 644-45; Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at
855-56.
68. See In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 350 (Wash. 1968). Washington, which had a certification
procedure prior to adoption of the U.L.A., adopted the procedure to simplify the process for
obtaining decisions on questions of state law. The legislators deemed the procedure a shortcut in
comparison to other available alternatives. Cf. Dickenson v. Townside T.V. & Appliance, Inc., 770
F. Supp. 1122, 1132 n.8 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (noting that the parties had requested that the federal
court certify a question to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the federal court wrote:
"There, of course, ... remains the possibility that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
would refuse such certification, and this court would be left to decide the issue based on its informed
'prediction' of how that Court would have ruled had it accepted such certification.").
69. See supra note 35 (stating that Commissioners did not feel that one purpose of Act was to
resolve conflict-of-laws problems). Commissioner Horowitz pointed out that, in conflict-of-laws
situations, no state is required to follow another state's law in the way that the federal court is
required to follow state law under Erie. Transcript of 1967, at 5-6. A state can always decide that,
for public-policy reasons, its law, rather than that of another state, should be applied. Id.
70. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19. See also White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 674 (Me. 1974)
(noting "[t]he nature and the objectives of 'certification' as a state-proferred [sic] instrumentality of
cooperation, for mutual benefit, between this [state] Court and the federal judiciary"); Jefferson v.
Moran, 479 A.2d 734, 738 (R.I. 1984) (stating that "[w]e are most appreciative of the federal district
court's application of principles of comity in certifying this question to us").
71. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A.
51 (1975); see also Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States District Court, 588 F.2d 543,
544 (6th Cir. 1978) (denying request for mandamus to postpone federal trial when Kentucky state
court is hearing similar case, in part because state provided certification procedure in federal-to-state
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issues.12 The reported cases involving certified questions suggest that these objec-
tives have been attained. 7 Nevertheless, only eleven states and the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico have adopted statutes that are nearly identical to the U.L.A.
74
Thus, only these jurisdictions can benefit fully from the advantages that certifi-
cation brings to conflict of laws in both federal-to-state and interstate situations.
State courts without the ability to certify in the appropriate context have the
same two alternatives as their federal counterparts - abstention or guesswork.7
The concern with these two options remains the same as in the federal context.
76
The presence and use of interstate-certification provisions in state statutes and
court rules would solve these problems, just as they have in the federal-to-state
sphere.7 Nevertheless, in the forty-six-year history of certification in this coun-
try,78 no state judge has ever utilized these state-to-state certification procedures.
79
The nonuse of interstate certification usually stems from the various choice-
of-law approaches and exceptions that allow a jurisdiction to avoid applying the
law of another state, even in cases in which such law seems to govern. By using
escape devices and other techniques to conclude that the law of the forum should
be applied, the courts often engage in judicial conjecture, at the expense of
fairness and justice. 0 States that either manipulate choice-of-law doctrine to avoid
certification or lack such a procedure justify nonimplementation by the fear that
use of certification will result in a deluge of cases flooding their court systems.
context), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 913 (1979). Kentucky Rule 76.37, which is almost identical to the
U.L.A., was adopted so the Kentucky Supreme Court could ensure that no federal-court interpretation
of Kentucky law became final before the Kentucky Supreme Court could have the opportunity to
render an opinion on the same issue. KY. R. Civ. P. 76.37 (1978).
72. See generally Transcripts of 1966 and 1967, supra note 19, at 5 (stating that certification
provides uniformity by allowing jurisdiction to be final arbiter of its own law); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 90, supplemental note (1979) (listing ability for ultimate control over own law as reason for
enactment). See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' prefatory note, 12
U.L.A. 50 (1975) (contending that certification "is a more rapid method than the use of the abstention
doctrine and seems to be a much more orderly way of handling the problem [of resolving difficult
state law issue]").
73. See, e.g., Bushkin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662, 663 (Mass. 1985) (answering
questions from First Circuit regarding choice-of-law issue of whether to apply Massachusetts or New
York law); Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 290-91 (Mass. 1977) (responding to question
regarding construction of parental-notification statute to assist determination of statute's constitu-
tionality); Hiram Ricker & Sons v. Students Int'l Mediation Soc'y, 342 A.2d 262 (Me. 1975) (construing
licensing statute to answer certified question in diversity action involving Maine and California
residents), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976).
74. The states are Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix part B (providing citations).
75. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that these possibilities mean that court
either never resolves case or bases decision on potentially erroneous interpretation of law).
76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (stating that problem with abstention is failure to
resolve case, and problems with guesswork are potentially erroneous interpretation of law, possible
disruption of state's law, and lack of comity).
77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting that federal courts have third option of
certification to assist in resolving cases involving state law).
78. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text (discussing development of federal-to-state
certification, with emphasis on Florida).
79. This conclusion is in part the result of a Lexis search of the States library, Omni file, using
the search term "certif! w/seg (question law)" and a Westlaw search of the Allstates database, using
the search term "opinion (certif! & "question law")".
80. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 10, at 432-33 (discussing complexity and manipulability of
choice-of-law issues, with emphasis on doctrine of renvoi).
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Upon closer scrutiny, however, this justification appears to have little weight. In
the nearly half-century history of the interjurisdictional-certification process, only
a handful of questions have ever been certified."' And all of those questions have
been sent from the federal to the state courts . 2 None of the forty jurisdictions
with certification procedures has reported being overburdened by the number of
certified questions, despite the prevalent fear of inundation.
In addition, a number of procedural devices built into certification statutes
decreases the possibility of hardship by permitting self-policing by both the
certifying and answering courts. 3 The certifying court will only certify those
questions of law for which no controlling precedent exists in an answering
jurisdiction." Furthermore, the ultimate power to accept or reject a certified
question rests exclusively in the discretion of the answering court.s" These two
procedural safeguards more than protect the answering court from a surfeit of
certification cases because as a practical matter that court completely controls its
docket and may reject certified-question cases if the number becomes overwhelm-
ing. The answering court need not even offer a reason for declining to answer;
most courts, however, do offer an explanation."
Many of these states argue that, as an outgrowth of inundation, response
time becomes severely delayed and the actual litigation greatly slowed. Given that
the number and frequency of certified questions remains small, however, the
issue arises only if the docket is already overburdened. In addition, even if the
number of certifications increases, as I submit it should, most courts afford
preferential treatment to certified questions, often giving them priority over
intrastate questions. After all, cases that have the capacity to clarify existing law,
or indeed to address an issue of first impression, would have the potential to
minimize other time-consuming litigation. Even if the actual certification action
becomes somewhat slowed during the process, this seems a small price for correct
resolution of the matter. Courts should be placing a premium on deciding cases
well, and not just quickly. Thus, as the fear of overburden from certification is
81. Conn. U.L.A. Hearings on H.B. 6249 Before the Joint Standing Judiciary Committee, at
364 (discussing study indicating over a three-year period only fifty answers to certified questions in
the federal-to-state context) [hereinafter Hearings on H.B. 6249]. In the several years that New York
has had a certification statute only seven certified questions were seen and two answered. See infra
note 379 and accompanying text.
82. Id.
83. See infra notes 174-258 and accompanying text (regarding provisions of U.L.A.).
84. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967). Certification is not
appropriate where there are controlling state decisions. Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 735
F.2d 1165, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1984). It cannot be used by the litigants for back-door modifications
of settled state law. Id.
85. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § I, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967); see infra notes 108-
31 and accompanying text (discussing discretionary nature of accepting or rejecting certified questions
and importance of this discretion in alleviating overburdening of dockets).
86. Although it is not often the case, a state may determine that a question of state law is not
involved. See Mercantile Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Purifoy, 371 A.2d 650 (Md. 1977); Members
of Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt, 405 A.2d 16 (R.I. 1979). Courts frequently offer reasons
- such as pending litigation in the lower state court on the same question - that a state court
believed that the state question was not determinative of the case, or that there was controlling
precedent on the issue when refusing to answer a certified question. See generally Roger J. Miner,
The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptions for Relief, 51 ALB. L. REV. 151
(1987).
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unfounded, the real reasons for the nonuse of interstate certification more likely
are mere ignorance of the process and its benefits, and a desire to maintain
control over questions of law.
The control and ignorance factors become readily apparent when one ex-
amines the reasons for the limited use of certification in the federal-to-state
context and its rejection or lack of use in the state-to-state context. In the federal-
diversity setting, certification encourages the state court to maintain or extend
control over questions of its own law (by allowing the state court to receive and
decide the question); that is, the state court rules on issues that should be decided
by reference to that state's law, rather than to federal law. 7 In the state-to-state
context, however, an individual state court may view the act of sending a certified
question to another state as a surrender of control. Indeed, the total lack of
interstate-certification cases supports this hypothesis." Thus, forum courts effec-
tively maintain control over cases that are better answered by another state
through various conflict-of-laws processes.8 9 The states that hope to retain such
control fail to appreciate that ideally, as a matter of comity, each cooperating
state would not only certify questions, but also answer those from other juris-
dictions. 90
It remains true that interstate certification has not been employed, even in
states providing for it by statute. Perhaps the fact that not all states have such
statutes deters those that do from using the process, as states tend not to extend
privileges without expecting reciprocity. While many of the states with certification
statutes have provisions for interstate certification, some can only answer certified
questions and lack the ability to propound them.9' Thus, the goal of comity in
87. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text (overviewing policies of U.L.A.).
88. Other speculations have been made concerning why state-to-state certification is unused,
including forum bias and that the forum state perceives that it has greater expertise or equal
knowledge to that of an answering court. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 10, at 431-33. Forum bias
cannot be overcome by optional certification. The idea that the forum court possesses knowledge or
expertise over the answering court defies logic. The answering court applies and interprets its state
law regularly, while the forum court faces relatively unfamiliar territory when expounding the law
of another jurisdiction.
89. Renvoi arises when the choice-of-law process of the forum jurisdiction refers the court to
the choice-of-law rule of the foreign jurisdiction. See generally Ernst 0. Schreiber, The Doctrine of
the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law, 31 HARv. L. REv. 523 (1918); Stanley B. Stein, Choice of Law
and the Doctrine of Renvoi, 17 MCGILL L.J. 581 (1971); Comment, Renvoi and the Modern
Approaches to Choice-of-Law, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 1049 (1981). Often the doctrine of renvoi as well
as unfavorable law can be avoided by employing such escape devices as characterization of the issue.
Simply put, if a forum court determines that the case before it is a torts case rather than a contracts
case (when in fact there are elements of both tort and contract involved) it may be able to apply its
own law if it uses the place-of-the-injury rule for torts instead of the place-of-making rule for
contracts.
Although the courts have many alternatives in the choice-of-law arena, often a state relies on
the law of the forum. See, e.g., R. LELAR, L. McDouoAL & R. FEUX, AMEXICAN CONFLICTS LAW
143-45 (4th ed. 1986). Another malleable tool is for the state court to find that the application of
another state's law would violate the public policy of the forum. Id.; see also Comment, supra, at
1051.
90. When discussing balance-of-power issues, comity usually arises in the federal/state context
involving diversity-of-citizenship cases and issues involving federal-question jurisdiction. Miner, supra
note 86, at 151-57. In the federal-to-state certification context, certification is a tool for administering
comity. In the state-to-state context, however, the system is not self-administering because there is
no doctrine like Erie to mandate compliance. State courts are more likely to want to answer questions
than to send them, because they perceive it as surrendering control to the answering court.
91. See infra note 309.
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this area must await legislatures and courts to catch up with a new standard for
uniformity. 92
The lack of understanding and knowledge of the purpose and merits of
interstate certification presents an alternative reason for general nonuse. Legis-
lators often remain ignorant about the possibility of interstate certification.93 And
when interstate-certification statutes are enacted, judges unanimously fail to utilize
them. 94 This situation presumably arises from simple lack of awareness, rather
than from outright rejection of certification. Both the Connecticut and Min-
nesota statutes,9 for example, append identical, incorrect lists of jurisdictions
that possess certification statutes. 97 This lack of information is symptomatic of
the general level of ignorance and confusion.
The inconsistent use of federal-to-state certification and the nonuse of
interstate certification is not surprising when the certification system, which relies
on interaction with other jurisdictions, is replete with inconsistencies concerning
the jurisdictions with which the process can be employed. 9 In order to correct
the misuse and lack of use of certification, statutes need to be consistent across
jurisdictions. The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act attempted to
bring that about.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF
LAW ACT OF 1967
A. Power to Answer
Section 1 of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, entitled
"Power to Answer," 99 is the most complicated and important section of the Act,
setting forth its substance. The remaining sections, with the exception of Section
8, simply detail the procedure for invoking and implementing the first section.
Section 1 reads:
The [Supreme Court] may answer questions of law certified to it by the
Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States,
a United States District Court [or the highest appellate court or the intermediate
92. See infra notes 426-58 and accompanying text (proposing new U.L.A. to better enforce
comity and reciprocity and hence encourage better results in cases involving interstate certification).
93. Connecticut, for example, in its extensive legislative history of certification, makes no mention
of interstate certification. The complete lack of discussion suggests ignorance. See Hearings on H.B.
6249, supra note 81. Equally importantly, legislators - lawyers and nonlawyers alike - often are
unaware of the conflict-of-laws ramifications of the substantive laws that they pass.
94. See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text (stating that alternatives to certification are
abstention and guesswork, and that state courts still rely exclusively on both).
95. "Given the relatively small number of states that offer the process to sister-state courts,
state courts' ignorance about certification is understandable." Corr & Robbins, supra note 10, at
431.
96. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199a (West 1987) (listing only 27 of 36 states with
certification statutes); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061 (West Supp. 1986) (same).
97. More recent codifications continue the error. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199(a) (West
Supp. 1989); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061 (West Supp. 1989).
98. See infra notes 99-248 and accompanying text (highlighting inconsistencies between statutes
and rules authorizing certification; inconsistencies include appropriate sending courts, different stan-
dards for accepting questions, and presence or absence of interstate certification).
99. "Power to Answer" is bracketed, thus leaving each state free to entitle this section differently.
Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1975).
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appellate court of any other state], when requested by the certifying court if
there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which
may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and to
which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the
decisions of the [Supreme Court] [and the intermediate appellate courts] of this
state.'°°
1. Which Court May Answer
Section 1 permits only the highest state court to receive and respond to
certified questions.'10 The Commissioners' rejection of the alternative of allowing
intermediate-level state appellate courts to respond to these questions 0 2 sheds
light on the reason that Section 1 was so structured. In 1966, the American Law
Institute, in its own proposed Act, limited certification to the highest court of
the answering state, 03 a move later accepted by the U.L.A. Commissioners.'
°4
The motivation for this decision stemmed from the inherent delay in certification
that the Commissioners perceived would be increased by certification to an
intermediate state court, 03 whose decisions would always be subject to appeal
and reversal. 0 6 Thus, certification to intermediate courts would defeat the major
purpose of the U.L.A. - to obtain a definitive answer on state law, and, in
turn, to save court and litigant time by having the state law's final arbiter resolve
an unclear issue.'0 7 By adopting the more limited approach, and hence avoiding
the risks of appeal and reversal, the Commissioners ensured their objective.
2. Discretionary Power to Answer
The second important element of Section 1 leaves the power to answer
certified questions to the answering court's discretion. 06 The language of the
100. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967). "Supreme Court"
is bracketed because, in certain states (such as Maine, Massachusetts, New York, and West Virginia),
the highest court is not called the supreme court. Thus, each state substitutes its equivalent court to
the supreme court when promulgating the U.L.A. In Oklahoma, for example, because the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest court in the state for criminal matters, while the Oklahoma
Supreme Court is the highest court for civil cases, the Oklahoma certification statute provides that
both courts have the power to answer. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1601-1611 (West Supp. 1976)
(adopted July 1, 1963).
101. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
102. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-607 (1973) (allowing Maryland Court of
Appeals or Court of Special Appeals to certify question of law to highest appellate court or
intermediate appellate court of any other state). This grant of power to its courts is useless, however,
since currently no states allow any but the court of last resort for civil and criminal cases to answer
certified questions.
103. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 292, 294 (1968) [hereinafter ALl STUDY]; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 147 (1967).
104. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
105. ALI STUDY, supra note 103, at 294.
106. See Thompson v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Ky. 1983) (opining that Kentucky
Rule 76.37, which is essentially identical to the U.L.A., provides that highest court of state answers
certified questions because customarily high-court precedents bind intermediate courts, and, therefore,
to apply to intermediate court first and then to high court becomes duplication and waste of time
and effort).
107. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (statement of Chief Judge Charles Joiner) (asserting
that certification provides procedure for resolving "significant problem[s] of law of a state").
108. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967) (stating that
"[t]he [Supreme Court] may answer") (emphasis added).
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statute indicates that the answering court has the power to answer or reject the
certified questions.'09 The reasons for this discretionary power, and the guidelines
under which it may be used, follow.
a. Rationale
The Commissioners decided to make the power to answer discretionary
because mandatory language might have rendered the statute unconstitutional
under some state constitutions." 0 Moreover, to require an answering court to
render a ruling could have impeded passage of the Act in certain states, because
some legislatures may be loath to constrain their courts with mandatory jurisdic-
tion. I'
One positive aspect of discretion is that it allows the answering state court
to operate as a check on the certifying federal court to ensure that the latter
meets the standards required to certify." 2 If the federal court failed to meet the
requisites, the state court could reject the question." 3 In this way, the state court
could avoid answering too many certified questions. The procedure also ensures
that the federal court properly consider an issue .before certifying it. Thus, the
Commissioners incorporated another check to avoid undue burden and to stream-
line the process.
Professor Vestal believed that discretion to answer was the best approach,
as it prevents the problem of an answering court creating artificial reasons to
avoid responding." 4 The answering court thus controls its docket," 5 and, if it
felt that timing made a definitive answer unwise, it could postpone responding
simply by declining to answer." 6 Federal courts have exercised this power in
109. See id. Commissioners' comment (indicating that answering court may refuse to answer);
see also Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 669 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that
answering court need not respond to certified question).
110. Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 41. Of the four states having the procedure at the
time of adoption of the U.L.A., only Washington used the mandatory language of "shall render."
But see In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 350 (Wash. 1968) (stating that word "shall" does not denote
mandatory use; rather, statute may be applied on discretionary basis); see also id. at 625-26, 446
P.2d at 363 (Hale, J., dissenting) (arguing that statute is constitutional if it may be applied on
discretionary basis, but disagreeing with majority that this construction must be imposed on present
statute).
111. The clerks of the courts of various states indicated in numerous telephone interviews that
their statutes are, of course, discretionary, that the state supreme court can do as it wishes, and that
they would not tolerate being forced by another state or federal court to answer any particular
question. Along the same lines, the receiving court could typically feel free to reframe the question
certified. See, e.g., Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Center, Inc., 938 F.2d 90, 94 n.2 (8th Cir. 1991);
Martinez v. Rodriguez, 394 F.2d 156, 159 n.6 (5th Cir. 1968). See also infra notes 203-04 and
accompanying text.
112. See infra Parts II A 3 b & II A 4 (noting that discretion allows courts control over own
dockets and avoidance of questions not ripe for answer or where answer already exists).
113. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
114. See Vestal, supra note 10, at 625 (asserting that discretion avoids problems of artificial
reasoning and, therefore, the possible creation of bad law).
115. Id. But see supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text (contending that the fear of deluge
often articulated as the rationale for certain language in the U.L.A. and corresponding state statutes
seems to be a perception without basis in fact, as no court has been seriously overburdened by the
number of certified questions received).
116. Vestal, supra note 10, at 635. Although this portion of the article focused on intrajurisdic-
tional certification, the same principles were applied in adopting the U.L.A. Unif. Certification of
Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 52-53 (1975); see Jackson v. Johns-
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asbestos litigation, for example, in which the court refuses to answer the posed
question on ripeness grounds or because the same issue is currently being decided
at the state level.1
7
b. Substantive guidelines for determining when the state court will answer
The plain language of Section 1 of the U.L.A. commands that the standard
of "no controlling precedent" must be met before a certified question will be
answered."' Section 1 also explicitly states that only a question that "may be
determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court" will be an-
swered. 19 Apart from these expressions in the Act, case law provides further
insight into the guidelines that some states use when determining whether to
respond to a certified question.
Generally, when several questions are certified and answering one of them
disposes of the case or renders the others moot, the state court declines to answer
the remaining questions. 20 Some courts fail to follow this example, however.' 12
The holdings of these cases support the suggestion that, due to the discretionary
nature of the power to answer, state courts occasionally preserve questions for
later review when policy or other reasons dictate ripeness.
Manville Sales Corp., 757 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (certifying questions to Mississippi
Supreme Court); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1985) (declining
without explanation to answer three certified questions from Fifth Circuit); see also Harry W. Swegle,
Washington Perspective, 7 STATE CT. J. 3 (Fall 1983) (asserting that federal-court perception of need
for definitive answer may differ from that of state court, and that discretion leaves ultimate decision
in hands of state court). The Jackson case involved tort recovery for cancer allegedly caused by
exposure to asbestos, and marked the first asbestos case in Mississippi. Approximately 1,700 other
such cases are pending in Mississippi's state and federal courts. Further, asbestos litigation is now
occurring throughout the United States. The resolution of the certified questions potentially could
have had an enormous economic impact, and it could have affected a large number of people.
Indeed, due to the massive amount of pending litigation, an answer by the Mississippi Supreme
Court would have been both cost-effective and time-saving. One might assume that the Mississippi
Supreme Court felt that the issue(s) presented were not yet ripe for adjudication. Absent the court's
articulation, however, this assumption can only be speculation.
117. See supra note 116 (discussing Mississippi Supreme Court's refusal to answer Fifth Circuit's
certified questions in asbestos case without explanation).
118. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967); see also Hillsborough
v. Bennett, 173 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1965) (finding that prerequisites of Florida Appellate Rule 4.61 must
be met or certified question will be denied answer). But cf. Thirty v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 445
P.2d 1012, 1017 (Wash. 1968) (answering the certified question although it was not one of first
impression). The Washington court later indicated that the federal court would not have certified the
question in Thirty had the Washington Supreme Court promulgated its rules for certification prior
to that decision. In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 358 (Wash. 1968).
119. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
120. See Buskin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662, 671 (Mass. 1985) (declining to
answer one of three questions certified by First Circuit because answer to other questions rendered
particular question moot); Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 292 (Mass. 1977) (refusing to
answer two questions certified because court viewed response to other question as dispositive); Hiram
Ricker & Sons v. Students Int'l Meditation Soc'y, 342 A.2d 262, 269 (Me. 1975) (same), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1042 (1976); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 127 S.E.2d 385, 388 (W. Va. 1962) (same); see also supra
and infra notes 117 & 118-42 and accompanying text (discussing contents of certification order
including question(s) posed and statement of facts).
121. See In re Boyd v. First Nat'l Bank of Pryor, 658 P.2d 470, 474 (Okla. 1983) (stating that
answer to first certified question may determine issues presented, but still addressing second question
to assist certifying court if first answer not determinative); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 672 S.W.2d
922. 924-25 (Ky. 1984) (determining that statute Sixth Circuit asked it to construe was inapplicable
to case, but also holding statute unconstitutional).
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A federal 'court that has federal-question jurisdiction may nonetheless be
motivated to certify a related state-law question, in order to avoid unnecessary
resolution of a federal constitutional issue. Some state courts have accepted
certification in this situation if answering the question posed involved state-court
construction of a state statute and, under one construction, a challenge to its
constitutionality might be avoided or modified.In Only a statute subject to two
different interpretations permits such a certification. Similarly, if a particular
feature of the state constitution is dispositive of the case, certification would be
proper.' Nevertheless, if the statute in question is unambiguous or its interpre-
tation rests upon the scope of a state constitutional provision that parallels the
Federal Constitution, the certification typically will be declined." In either
scenario, certification is improper because the answering court must resolve the
federal constitutional issue.
State courts also refuse to respond to certified questions if an answer would
leave the conflict open. Such unresolved cases result when further state involve-
ment is required, for example, or because the federal court lacks power to grant
the relief sought.12S State courts also decline to answer certified questions based
on the manner in which the questions are posed,'2 or if there is no agreement
on the stipulated facts.1
2 7
c. State procedures for deciding whether to accept certifications
All of the states that allow certification provide procedural mechanisms to
determine whether certified questions can be entertained. Some states place the
decision of acceptance of the certified question on the regular docket for hearing
122. See White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 674-675 n.10 (Me. 1974) (asserting that certification is
proper and noting that in past this situation was viewed as "paradigm" for abstention by federal
court); see also Abrams v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 263 S.E.2d 103, 108 (W.Va. 1980) (finding
that, if state court cannot answer question to avoid federal constitutional issue, then certification
was inappropriate).
123. White, 320 A.2d at 684; Abrams, 263 S.E.2d at 107; accord In re Beverly Hills, 672 S.W.2d
at 922, 923 (Ky. 1984) (accepting certified question involving interpretation of state statute to determine
whether it violated unique provision of Kentucky Constitution).
124. Abrams, 263 S.E.2d at 108 (declining to answer question involving interpretation of West
Virginia equal protection and due process clauses); accord White, 320 A.2d at 684 n.7. But cf. In re
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 334 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa 1983) (answering questions
involving whether a state statute violates equal protection and uniform taxation provisions of Iowa
Constitution).
125. Jefferson v. Moran, 479 A.2d 734, 736-38 (R.I. 1984) (refusing to answer certified questions
because, regardless of answer, federal district court lacked jurisdiction to afford petitioner relief
under Pennhurst St. School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding that federal court
cannot award injunctive relief against state officials on basis of state law)); see also Greene v. Massey,
384 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1980) (declining to answer question regarding reversal of criminal conviction for
sake of justice, since response would not be determinative of cause). In Berkshire Cablevision, Inc.
v. Burke, 488 A.2d 676, 679 (R.I. 1985), however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court chose to answer
the question because the answer "will provide a resolution of the state-law issue before the First
Circuit, necessitating neither federal injunctive relief on that ground nor further involvement by our
state courts .... [Furthermore, the issues are of substantial public importance], and their resolution
should not be further delayed absent extraordinary justification." Id.
126. See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text (noting that receiving court may modify
question posed by certifying court).
127. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (noting that answering court may not find
facts).
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by the full bench. 21 In other states, certifications receive preferential treatment
over the regular docket when scheduled for hearing by the full bench. 129 In North
Dakota, for example, the clerk routinely schedules the certified question for the
next case conference and immediately distributes it to the justices, who meet in
conference to decide whether to accept the certification. 30 In Oklahoma, however,
the clerk presents the certification to one judge, who decides whether to answer
the question(s) certified and who then presents his or her decision to the full
bench for approval. 3 '
3. Certifying Courts
a. Which courts can certify
The next element of Section 1 enumerates the courts that have the power to
certify questions of law to another jurisdiction's highest court. The Act permits
the following courts to certify: the Supreme Court of the United States,3 2 any
court of appeals of the United States, any United States district court, 33 "for
the highest appellate court or the intermediate court of any other state]."
In 1966, the Uniform Law Commissioners debated the important issue of
allowing federal district courts to certify. 3 4 Those who were opposed to giving
district courts this power argued that permitting only federal appellate courts to
certify would ensure that the factfinding function remained in its proper forum,
the federal courts. 35 No argument or delay over the statement of facts 36 would
occur if the answering court simply used the record sent up on appeal.,3 7 Such
a full factual record also allays the criticism aimed at certification that answering
courts merely issue advisory opinions. 38 The Commissioners also believed that
state legislatures would be less likely to approve certification from fear of demands
128. Telephone interview with Clerk of Court of Massachusetts (June 17, 1985); Telephone
interview with M. Graves, Clerk of Court of Wisconsin (June 17, 1985).
129. Telephone interview with M. Quinlin, Assistant Clerk of Court of Kansas (July 16, 1985);
Telephone interview with J. Scott, Clerk of Court of Kentucky (June 17, 1985).
130. Telephone interview with Luella Dunn, Clerk of Court of North Dakota (July 12, 1985).
131. Telephone interview with Jim Patterson, Clerk of Court of Supreme Court of Oklahoma
(July 12, 1985). Apparently, if the judge accepts certification and the case is ultimately decided, the
accepting judge writes the opinion and that answer is returned to the certifying court in the form of
a memorandum opinion. Id.
132. See Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978) (ordering question of state law to be certified);
Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 (1963) (same). In addition, the Court has remanded cases suggesting
certification. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25
(1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Clay
v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
133. See supra notes 32-43 (discussing modification of language by Commissioners); see also Unif.
Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, Commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 52-53 (1967)
(incorporating three-judge district courts into district-court language of U.L.A.).
134. See Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 9.
135. See Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 869 (noting that existence of
factual record lends credence to argument that court is merely assisting in resolution of controversy).
136. A statement of facts is required by the Act. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law
Act § 3(2), 12 U.L.A. 53 (1967).
137. Id.
138. See Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 870 (asserting that highest
state court can be expected to prefer questions accompanied by a full factual record to abstractions
akin to advisory opinions).
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on workload, given the already burgeoning caseloads of most state courts, if
federal district courts were allowed to certify. 3 9 Professor Vestal further argued
that appellate-court cases perhaps have more significance than ones terminating
in the district court, and, therefore, deserved greater attention from state courts.'1
4
Those in favor of including this provision contended that district courts
could readily determine the clarity of another jurisdiction's law, and were probably
better suited to do so, because trial judges face such issues more regularly than
appellate courts do.1 41 Furthermore, without such power, an appeal, in effect,
becomes mandatory to resolve the instant litigation properly, as any outcome
attained without certainty of the appropriate law remains sheer conjecture, and
thus creates automatic grounds for appeal.' 42 Moreover, proponents argued,
including the district courts would save time and money, both major concerns in
the certification debate, by resolving cases as early in the process as possible.'
43
The Commissioners also discussed whether to allow for interstate certifica-
tion. 1" On this issue, Professor Vestal argued that the Act presented an oppor-
tunity to not only solve Erie federal-diversity problems, but also to provide a
procedural vehicle to settle frequent conflict-of-laws problems.' 45 The Commis-
sioners ultimately failed to agree with the dissenters, however, asserting that state
legislatures would be reluctant to approve an Act mandating such a plan.'" The
Commissioners compromised, by making the adoption of interstate-certification
language throughout the Act highly recommended, but optional.' 47 Therefore,
the portion of Section 1 (as well as the entire Sections 8 and 9) allowing the
highest and intermediate appellate courts of a state to certify to another juris-
diction appears in brackets, to denote its nonmandatory nature.'"
b. The nature and scope of the power to certify
Under the U.L.A., a state high court's power to answer questions of law
certified by another court vests courts of other jurisdictions with the inherent
power to certify questions to that court.' 49 This power is discretionary,5 0 and the
139. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 18-19.
140. Id. at 19; see also Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 870 (stating
that restricting district court's right to certify may result in inherent selectivity among cases).
141. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 19.
142. Id. at 8.
143. Id. at 18-19.
144. Id. at 8.
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text (discussing fears by legislators that interstate
certification would cause overburdened dockets and lack of reciprocity).
147. Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 14. One Commissioner suggested eliminating the state
intermediate court only. He suggested that there might be a mechanism within the state by which a
state trial judge could ask a higher court judge whether certification was appropriate. Id. at 21.
148. Id. Commissioner Davies strongly opposed this bracketing. He argued that each bracket
makes a state face and worry about an issue; the fewer decisions imposed on a state, he thought,
the more likely the passage. Further, elimination of brackets produces greater uniformity in legislation
adopted by the states. He later argued that only the state language in Section 1 should be bracketed,
and not in Sections 8 and 9, because the policies behind Section 1 and Sections 8 and 9 are different.
Section l's brackets protect the home court, while Sections 8 and 9 allow the court to go to other
state courts if it needs to. The majority of Commissioners felt, however, that there shouldn't be a
privilege to certify if that same court wouldn't accept questions certified to it.
149. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
150. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974) (stating in dictum that use of
certification procedure is in federal court's discretion).
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U.L.A. Commissioners declined to offer a test or other guidelines for when a
court should certify a question to another jurisdiction. 5' Thus, the factors that
guide the exercise of this discretion determine, to a certain degree, the usefulness
of certification in ameliorating the problems created by the Erie doctrine in the
context of federal-to-state certification, and conflict-of-laws problems in the state-
to-state setting.
Through interpretation of Florida's certification statute and appellate rule,'
5 2
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has led the way in
defining the factors for deciding whether to certify a question of law. Many
other states' 3 adhere to the factors for determining the appropriateness of
certification enumerated by Fifth Circuit Judge Homer Thornberry in Florida ex
rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp.'5 4 Judge Thornberry set forth the following criteria:
(1) the closeness of the question to settled law in the state;' 5 (2) the existence of
sufficient sources to allow a principled rather than conjectural decision;'5 6 (3) the
degree to which comity considerations are relevant, as determined by state and
public policy and the importance of the issue to the state; '7 (4) the delay and
cost to the litigants;'5 " and (5) the ability of the certifying court to frame the
151. Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 41.
152. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1945); FLA. App. R. 9.150.
153. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 701 F.2d 1266, 1268 (8th Cir. 1983)
(applying these factors to Nebraska certification statute); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune
Co., 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1324 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (applying these factors to Iowa certification statute
and declining to certify because an answer would not be determinative of case and because question
raises de novo interpretation of state judicial law rather than statutory construction, thus giving less
reason to certify); American Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Heimann, 683 F.2d 999, 1002 (6th Cir.
1982) (citing Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
930 (1976); see infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text, and denying appellants' certification motion
because statute had not been judicially interpreted and no legislative history existed). In American
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., the Kentucky Court of Appeals used the plain language of the statute to
guide its interpretation, despite the parties' contentions that the statute was subject to different
interpretations. Id. But see Response for Appellee in Opposition to Appellant's Motion for an Order
Certifying Questions of Law at 6, St. Paul Structural Steel Co. v. ABI Contracting, Inc., 364 N.W.2d
83 (N.D. 1985) (arguing successfully that North Dakota Supreme Court should not certify question
to Minnesota Supreme Court based on factors articulated in Florida ex rel. Shevin).
154. 526 F.2d 266, 274-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 930 (1976). Judge Thornberry may
have relied on the factors found in the ALI STU=Y, supra note 103, at 294-96. Indeed, the factors
the ALl lists - that the states have an established procedure, that the certification request meets the
test that the statute employs, and that there be no undue delay and prejudice to the parties - are
similar to those adopted in Shevin.
155. Shevin, 526 F.2d at 274-75.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 275; see also Wade H. McCree, Foreword, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 255, 270 (1977)
(maintaining that cases involving issues of state constitutional construction are more sensitive than
those involving mere statutory construction and should, therefore, more likely be certified). But cf.
Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 867 (arguing that unconstrued state statute
and unconstrued state constitutional provision are equally deserving of certification). See also Nardone
v. Reynolds, 508 F.2d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 1975) (certifying question regarding applicability of statute
of limitations in medical-malpractice case and justifying on ground that matter was of "gravest public
policy" and likely to recur frequently).
158. Shevin, 526 F.2d at 275. Delay is often cited as the reason for a refusal to certify. See, e.g.,
American Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 683 F.2d at 1002 (noting inevitable delay of certification as
one reason to retain decision in statutory-construction case); Harris v. Karri-On Campers, Inc., 640
F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that certification late in proceedings needlessly prolongs suit at
parties' expense); Scuncio Motors, Inc. v. Subaru, 555 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 n.2 (D.R.I. 1982) (stating
that time constraints inherent in preliminary injunction preclude certification), aff'd, 715 F.2d 10 (1st
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issue in a manner that will produce a helpful response on the part of the state
court.5 9 Judge Thornberry suggested that the certifying court integrate these
elements into a balancing approach, considering the significance of the question
along with the benefits and costs of certification.' 60
The language of the U.L.A. reveals additional reasons for determining the
appropriateness of certification.' 6' The first such criterion arises because no power
to certify exists unless the proposed answering state court is authorized to
answer.' 6 12 Therefore, another factor in the decision to certify requires that an
established procedure for responding to certified questions be in place in the
intended answering jurisdiction. The U.L.A. provides two other express criteria:
first, Section 1 requires that the certified question "may be determinative of the
cause then pending in the certifying court"; 63 second, it must "appear to the
certifying court" that "no controlling precedent" for the certified questions exists
"in the decisions of the [Supreme Court] [and the intermediate appellate courts]
of th[e] state."' ' Without meeting these criteria, a court lacks the choice to
certify.
4. Type of Questions Certifiable
According to the U.L.A., the certifying court may certify "questions of
law" 65 "if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of
this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending."'6 The broadest
interpretation of this language regards certification as appropriate in all circum-
stances, short of superfluous state-court effort. Therefore, the answer to the
certified question may or may not be required to resolve the dispute in the
certifying court.
67
Cir. 1983); Response for Appellee in Opposition to Appellant's Motion for an Order Certifying
Questions of Law at 8, St. Paul Structural Steel Co. v. ABI Contracting, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 83 (N.D.
1985) (citing delay as reason for denying appellant's motion).
159. Shevin, 526 F.2d at 275.
160. Id. at 274-76.
161. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
162. See Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 41 (stating that court cannot certify unless proposed
answering court is authorized to respond, because courts lack inherent power to answer certified
questions).
163. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967). See infra Part II A
4 (discussing this language and determining that it does not require that answer absolutely resolve
cause, but merely that it appears reasonable that resolution will occur when applying answer to facts).
Questions have not been certified if this test is not met. See Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626
F.2d 1236, 1242 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that no certification will occur when cause merely "might"
be resolved due to tentative nature of issue), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981).
164. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967). See infra Part II A
5 (describing this standard as insurance that law is not already settled, to avoid waste of judicial and
litigant resources).
165. The phrase "questions of law" is considered more fully in Part 11 C I of this article, since
Section 3 (Contents of Certification Order) also employs this language. See infra notes 196-218 and
accompanying text (considering phrase "question of law" under auspices of U.L.A. § 3, which should
not contain issues of fact).
166. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
167. Cf. Independent School Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace, 752 F. Supp. 286, 298 (D. Minn.
1990) (finding sufficient Minnesota case law articulating appropriate test for determining constitu-
tionality of special laws). The court in Grace noted that a certification decision "rests in the sound
discretion of the federal court" under the may-be-determinative standard. Id.
Journal of Legislation
This approach contrasts with the more generally accepted view, that the
"may be determinative" language suggests that one answer the responding court
gives will terminate the case, while another will not.161 This interpretation, still
fairly broad, creates obstacles in states whose constitutions forbid the rendering
of advisory opinions. 16 9 It also suggests that certification may not be invoked
until the proceedings advance sufficiently for the certifying court to determine
whether the certified questions, if answered in a particular way, would terminate
the case. Such later-stage certification allows the state court to consider the
certified questions in light of the resolution of the issues that led to the questions'
formulation. It also ensures that resolving the state-law question is necessary to
the resolution of the federal-court case.170
The interpretation of the "may be determinative" language may be given a
more limited construction. Wyoming, for example, strictly interprets this phrase
to mean that the question cannot be answered unless any of the possible responses
disposes of the case. 17 1 This interpretation severely limits the utility of certification
by apparently making certification available only in diversity cases. In federal-
question-jurisdiction cases, the federal court would be certifying a question of
state law in the hope of avoiding a federal constitutional issue. 172 In that situation,
one answer resolves the federal-court dispute whereas an alternative response does
not terminate the case; it merely returns the case for resolution of the federal
constitutional issue.'73 In addition, this strict interpretation seems paradoxical, in
that it requires that the state law be unclear (thus not susceptible to divination
by the federal court), but at the same time requires the certifying court to judge
whether the answer will dispose of the case. The task of deciding if the answer
resolves the case is not easy when the court judging that issue does not know
how the law is to be interpreted and applied.
5. The Standard for Certification - "No Controlling Precedent in the
Decisions of the [Supreme Court] [and the Intermediate Appellate Courts] of
this State"
Section 1 of the U.L.A. requires the absence of "controlling precedent in
the decisions of the [Supreme Court] [and the intermediate appellate courts] of
168. ALl STUDY, supra note 103, at 295. Accord Pan Am. Computer Corp. v. Data General
Corp., 652 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding that Puerto Rico's highest court adopts this interpretation);
White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 677 (Me. 1974) (adopting same interpretation); Hiram Ricker & Sons
v. Students Int'l Mediation Soc'y, 342 A.2d 262, 264 (Me. 1975) (approving interpretation in White),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976). But cf. Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 488 A.2d 676, 679
(R.I. 1985) (answering question only because answer provided resolution of state-law issue before
First Circuit, necessitating neither federal injunctive relief nor further involvement of state courts
and thereby suggesting that cause must be terminated by answer).
169. See In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966) (holding that Maine will not answer unless
issue is last to be decided in case then pending in federal court).
170. See Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 869-70 (providing arguments
for allowing only appellate courts to certify).
171. In re Certified Question, 549 P.2d 1310, 1311 (Wyo. 1976).
172. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (explaining idea of certifying state-law question
to avoid reaching constitutional issue).
173. See id. (noting that certain answers to certified questions still require resolution of consti-
tutional issue).
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[the answering] state," for a question to be certified. 174 The U.L.A. Commis-
sioners discussed the meaning of "controlling precedent" before adopting that
language. 175 Some suggested that use of the word "controlling" would bind the
certifying courts to follow dated decisions of the potential answering state, even
if all other jurisdictions rejected that formulation. 176 These Commissioners pro-
posed other language to ensure that this type of situation remained certifiable. 177
The full Commission, however, decided to retain the original language.
Another suggestion advanced the language "controlling precedents in reported
decisions of the state,' ' 7  to parallel the rule that binds federal courts to all
reported decisions (including those of the trial court) of the state in which they
sit. Nonetheless, the plain language of the statute indicates that, if the statute or
law at issue in a case is clear, certification would be inappropriate.1 7 9
Certification is also proper when conflicting authority exists within the
state. s0 Courts in states that have certification procedures similar to the U.L.A.
generally recognize that the procedure attempts to resolve ambiguities or unan-
swered questions concerning state law.' Arguably, absent an opinion on point
in the highest court of the state, the law on that issue remains unresolved. The
next step for the federal court requires examination of intermediate-appellate-
court opinions, following them if applicable. 8 2 Assuming either conflicting opin-
174. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967). The bracketed
language indicates that appropriate variations may be adopted. Unif. Certification of Questions of
Law Act, Commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 52-53 (1975).
175. Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 34.
176. Id. at 34-35.
177. Id. at 35. But cf. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153,
160 (1948) (holding that, if state decision is of questionable precedential value, federal court need
not consider it controlling).
178. Professor Vestal maintained that, after the Supreme Court ruling in Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178 (1940) (finding that federal courts are bound by intermediate state-
court decisions), trial-court decisions were not controlling on federal courts. Transcript of 1967, supra
note 19, at 33-35. Others disagreed. If federal courts are bound by reported trial-court decisions,
then the U.L.A. statutory limitation of being bound only to decisions of the highest and intermediate
courts of the state would necessarily have to be widened to accommodate the Supreme Court's ruling
in Fidelity Union that a federal court must follow the law of a state even though it has not been
expounded by the highest state court. Id.; see Fidelity Union, 311 U.S. at 177.
179. See Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 669 (W. Va. 1979) (finding
it apparent that, where state law is clear, no need for certification arises); Trail Builders Supply Co.
v. Reagan, 409 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that, if there are no decisions on point, Erie-
bound court may certify issue to state supreme court); Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ga. 1982) (stating that when
answering certified questions it is necessary to consider implications for other fact situations, but
that it is similarly necessary to resist answering more than is asked).
180. Mason v. American Emory Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
815 (1957).
181. See Almarez v. Carpenter, 477 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1970) (discussing difference between first
appearance of statutory language and actual meaning); Irion v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 199
(Mont. 1969) (stating that only precedent on point supports divergent results in current case); In re
Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 355 (Wash. 1968) (finding that reason for certification is to provide authoritative
answer, exactly what case at bar required); Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248, 253 (Me. 1966)
(noting that question certified was same as one addressed in earlier federal district-court case, so
Maine Supreme Judicial Court must clear up confusion); see also O'Brien v. Tri-State Oil Tool
Indus., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (1983) (declining to certify because action lacks "ambiguity"
of controlling law necessary to invoke certification).
182. See Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 468 (1940) (finding federal courts
bound by state intermediate appellate-court decisions absent indication that highest court would
decide issue differently).
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ions or a total lack of rulings, the issue of law may be considered unresolved
and certification the logical resolution.
It appears that federal courts, both before and after the advent of certifi-
cation, have gone beyond the above two steps by deciding cases based upon
secondary authorities and recent trends in other jurisdictions. 83 Under the U.L.A.,
federal courts should choose to certify the question rather than to rely on this
somewhat attenuated authority, but this decision normally depends on other
factors considered by the certifying court.1 4 For example, comity is one of the
factors that should guide the exercise of the court's discretion to certify, but in
the same factual setting a comity argument often can support a decision either
for or against certification." 5
Furthermore, with language as manipulable as that in Section 1, the certifying
and receiving courts can avoid or minimize the effectiveness of the certification
procedure. Since disputes often arise over whether the law in question is clear or
merely difficult to ascertain,8 6 a federal court has a convenient way of either
avoiding or employing certification.8 7 It is necessary to clarify the certification
standard, however, for certification to be a useful device.
B. Method of Invoking
During the Commission's 1967 proceedings, lengthy debates occurred over
the inclusion of Section 2 of the U.L.A. as That section allows the certifying
court to issue a request for a certification order upon a motion from the court
or any party in the case. 89 Commissioner Davies argued that Section 8 of the
183. IA Pt. 2 JAMas W. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 0.307[2] (1991) (containing
citations).
184. See supra notes 150-64 and accompanying text (discussing guidelines for when to certify,
including existence of sources, relevant comity considerations, and delay and cost to litigants).
185. But see Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the
Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAIa L. REv. 717, 733-34 (1969) (arguing that states should
not be offended by federal-court guesses at rule of law and that federal opinions might benefit state
courts on undecided issues).
186. See, e.g., Miller v. N.R.M. Petroleum Corp., 570 F. Supp. 28, 30-31 (N.D. W.Va. 1983)
(declining to certify, although no decision on point existed in state high court's decisions, and relying
on expressions of legislature to decide case); Guillard v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 488 F.2d
20 (8th Cir. 1973) (remanding case for certification determination based on Minnesota Supreme Court
statement of willingness to change indemnity rule).
187. See Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 297 A.2d 721 (Md. 1972) (answering questions certified
from Virginia federal district court, despite finding two cases directly on point).
188. Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 46-52.
189. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 2, 12 U.L.A. 53 (1967). Section 2 (Method
of Invoking) provides that "[tihis [Act] [Rule] may be invoked by an order of any of the courts
referred to in Section 1 upon the court's own motion or upon the motion of any party to the cause."
Id.
Interestingly, a reading of certification cases indicates that state and federal courts often decline
to certify a question of law when the request is made by party motion. This result may occur because
the court is in the best position to determine whether the foreign jurisdiction's law is unclear, and
often, when a party seeks certification, the certifying court feels that the law is sufficiently settled,
and therefore that certification is inappropriate. See, e.g., In re Hartman Paving, Inc., 745 F.2d 307
(4th Cir. 1984); American Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Heimann, 683 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1982);
Harris v. Karri-On Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1981); Miller v. N.R.M. Petroleum Corp.,
570 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. W. Va. 1983); O'Brien v. Tri-State Tool Indus., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1119
(S.D. W. Va. 1983); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa
1981); Irwin v. Calhoun, 522 F. Supp. 576 (D. Mass. 1981); St. Paul Structural Steel Co. v. ABI
Contracting, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 83 (N.D. 1985); Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 297 A.2d 721
(Md. 1972). But see, e.g., Krashes v. White, 341 A.2d 798, 799 (Md. 1975) (answering certified
questions that federal court sent on motion of appellants).
Certification of Questions of Law
U.L.A. made sense because it allowed the certifying state to decide how to
certify, whereas Section 2 purported to instruct the certifying courts of a different
state how to act. He argued that a different state's legislature might call for a
different method for that court to invoke certification.'90
Professor Vestal responded that Section 2 simply indicated that a court could
certify either upon its own motion or at the suggestion of one of the litigants,
not that these must be the sole means for certification.' 9' He also argued for the
imposition of limitations on granting litigants' requests for certification. 92 For
example, a litigant who has invoked federal-diversity jurisdiction ordinarily should
not be permitted to request certification, 93 due to the unfairness of allowing a
party a federal determination of the facts and a state determination of the law.'9
This limitation applies equally to the defendant who removes the case from state
court or to the plaintiff who chooses to initiate suit in federal court. The
restriction seems particularly pertinent in removal cases, where the plaintiff, who
wants the whole case heard in the state court, now faces the delay of certification
despite initially choosing the proper forum. However, the restricted access to
federal courts caused by this limitation on certification motions goes against some
of the basic notions of allowing open federal forums. 95
C. Contents of Certification Order
1. Questions of Law to Be Answered
Section 3' 96 of the U.L.A. directs that the certification order set forth the
questions of law' 97 to be answered. The meaning of the phrase "questions of law
to be answered" has not been judicially construed, 98 but presumably the Com-
190. Transcript of 1967, supra note 19 at 46.
191. Id. at 49.
192. Id.
193. See ALI STUDY, supra note 103, at 296. The Commission deemed Professor Vestal's
arguments more persuasive and included Section 2 in the U.L.A. Unif. Certification of Questions of
Law Act § 2, 12 U.L.A. 53 (1967). Professor Vestal's position fails to account for circumstances in
which new or unanticipated issues arise in a case, making certification advisable but still unavailable
to a party. Perhaps leaving both parties free to move for certification and forcing the judge to make
the decision provides a sounder rule.
194. But see Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 869 (asserting that one
purpose of limiting certification to appellate courts is to allow plaintiff federal factfinding forum in
diversity cases).
195. Federal-court jurisdiction allows a party the choice of an arguably more impartial forum
than a state court that is susceptible to bias toward its citizens or government. In addition, federal
courts often possess expertise in areas of litigation that state courts lack. Finally, often overburdened
state-court dockets cause extensive delays in resolution of cases.
196. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 3, 12 U.L.A. 53 (1967). Section 3 reads: "A
certification order shall set forth (1) the questions of law to be answered; and (2) a statement of all
facts relevant to the questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the
questions arose." Id.
197. The Commissioners kept the plural "questions" at the suggestion of the Committee on Style,
which indicated that the plural was proper. See Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 45.
198. But see Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 297 A.2d 721, 725 (Md. 1972) (finding that
Maryland Legislature intended that all open questions certified be answered). It seems, however, that
most answering courts answer only the questions that are necessary to dispose of the case. See supra
notes 168 & 189; infra note 203.
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missioners intended that only questions of law be certified.199 The ambiguity of
the phrase "questions of law," however, provides substantial opportunity for
parties or for courts opposing certification to argue against its use, based on the
type of question asked. 200 It also allows courts to certify or answer questions
inappropriately. 20' The lack of uniformity in the case law suggests that whether
certified questions are answered depends on a policy decision by the receiving
court, rather than on U.L.A.-imposed restrictions. For instance, when more than
one question of law is certified, the answering court generally responds to a
question only if the answer to the preceding question was not dispositive of the
case.
202
Initially, either the parties or the certifying court frames the certified ques-
tions. 203 Most often, the parties agree to a set of questions subject to court
approval with or without modification. 2°4 If the parties are unable to agree, then
the court frames the questions. 20 1 The receiving court retains the power to alter
the language of the question, 2°0 although some courts have declined to answer
questions based on poor phraseology. These courts take the position that, unless
the certification order specifically allows the answering court to modify the
language, it cannot do so.201
199. See Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 302 (Mass. 1977) (finding that certification
statute only contemplates that questions of law be certified, yet providing comments on law to
cooperate in decisionmaking), aff'd, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). But see Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437
N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982) (answering certified questions that are factual in nature).
200. See Response for Appellee in Opposition to Appellant's Motion for an Order Certifying
Questions of Law at 9-11, St. Paul Structural Steel Co. v. ABI Contracting, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 83
(N.D. 1985) (arguing successfully against certification on several grounds, including that question
involved was factual in nature).
201. See Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 188-89 (responding to certified question involving issues of liability
for in utero injury caused by drug).
202. See Bushkin Assoc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662, 672 (Mass. 1985) (answering only
two of three questions certified because answers to earlier questions resolved case, thus making answer
to final question irrelevant); Miree v. United States, 249 S.E.2d 573, 580 (Ga. 1978) (same). See also
Hiram Ricker & Sons v. Students Int'l Mediation Soc'y, 342 A.2d 262, 269 (Me. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1042 (1976); Krashes v. White, 341 A.2d 798, 802 (Md. 1975) (declining to respond to
certain questions though parties urged court to answer); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 127 S.E.2d 385, 388 (W.
Va. 1962). But cf. In re Boyd v. First Nat'l Bank of Pryor, 658 P.2d 470, 474 (Okla. 1983) (stating
that "[w]hile our answer to the first certified question may be determinative ... we nevertheless
address the issues presented by the second question, for assistance to the certifying court"); In re
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 334 N.W.2d 290 (Iowa 1983) (answering certified question
based on briefs that expanded scope of question).
203. In two states, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, the cases indicate that the court alone frames
the questions. Murray v. Norberg, 423 F. Supp. 795 (D.R.I. 1976); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,
384 F. Supp. 600 (D. Mass. 1974).
204. Nardone v. Reynolds, 508 F.2d 660, 664 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975).
205. Id.; Allen v. Estate of Carman, 446 F.2d 1276, 1277 (5th Cir. 1971).
206. See Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Center, Inc., 938 F.2d 90, 94 n.2 (8th Cir. 1991); Martinez
v. Rodriguez, 394 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding for first time that the receiving court was not
bound by language of question but was free to reformulate it after analysis of record); Walters v.
Inexco Oil Co., 440 So. 2d 268, 272 (Miss. 1983) (reformulating question for greater clarity);
Certification from Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Wash. 1984) (altering question
to focus more clearly on issues that court believed must be resolved); see also Barnes v. Atlantic &
Pac. Life Ins. Co., 530 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1976) (changing language of questions received to consider
other issues).
207. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris, 460 So. 2d 120, 122 (Miss. 1984) (declining to answer certified
question because, given the way it was phrased, court would have to assume that its state statute
was unconstitutional, which was contrary to state policy); Krashes v. White, 341 A.2d 798, 802-03
Certification of Questions of Law
The receiving court's ability to reshape or add to the issues posed by the
certified question furthers the goals of certification. By definition, the receiving
court is best situated to frame the question for precedential value and to control
the development of its internal laws. In addition, if a state court takes offense
at a poorly framed question and declines to answer, it may miss an opportunity
to settle its own law on a particular point.
2. Statement of Facts-8
The certification order should also present a statement of the relevant facts. 2°9
The order may include exhibits, excerpts from the record, summaries of the facts
found by the court, and any other document that would assist the answering
court. 21 0 The language of the U.L.A. mandates including a statement of facts.
21'
This provision attempts to avoid violations of some state constitutions, which
prohibit their courts from answering abstract questions, by showing the presence
of an actual controversy to be resolved.
212
If the trial court certifies the question(s), the parties compose a joint statement
of facts to be sent to the answering court.213 If the court of appeals certifies the
question(s), however, the statement consists of the trial court's finding of facts.
The time entailed in gathering the necessary facts may often delay the certification
process. It is important, however, because many receiving courts simply will not
answer the questions presented in the absence of resolved or stipulated facts.
21 4
Certification procedures generally prohibit the answering court from engaging in
factfinding. 215 If the answering court perceives an inadequacy in the certifying
(Md. 1975) (stating that, because federal court did not provide for reformulation or rearrangement
of questions, court could not specifically answer second and third questions). Accord In re Certified
Question, 359 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. 1984).
208. See supra note 196 (providing text of Section 3).
209. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 3, 12 U.L.A. 53 (1967).
210. See Commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 53 (1975). Professor Vestal agreed to have the
comment state that portions of the record could be included. Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at
32.
211. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 3, 12 U.L.A. 53 (1967) (stating explicitly
that "[the] order shall set forth" a statement of facts).
212. See Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 32. Professor Vestal stated that this language
would ensure that the certifying court provides the answering court with a complete background of
the case as it developed, in order to avoid this danger. Id. This requirement presupposes that the
proceedings must be substantially advanced before certification is authorized.
213. Letter from James Fullin, Executive Secretary, Wisconsin Judicial Council, to Victoria Doran
(June 24, 1985) (stating that some jurisdictions are concerned that certified questions should be
permitted only upon facts stipulated by parties or factual findings by trial court); see Nardone v.
Reynolds, 508 F.2d 660, 663 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975) (requiring parties to submit joint statement of facts);
Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Secretary of Army, 489 F.2d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 1973) (same), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 842 (1974); Miree v. United States, 249 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. 1978) (same).
214. See White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 674-77 & n.10 (Me. 1974) (agreeing to respond only after
material facts had been either agreed to or resolved); see also Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prod., Inc.,
288 S.E.2d 511, 514 (W. Va. 1982) (answering certified question but stating that, because court was
presented with only conclusory facts, it could not pass on the evidentiary sufficiency of claim).
Certification never asks a court to pass on the evidentiary sufficiency of a claim, so the Sydenstricker
court answered a question that it could have declined on the ground of conclusory facts. It may
have chosen to answer in this way indirectly to alert the certifying court to the fact that the party
may lack a claim. See In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966) (holding that facts necessary to
resolve dispute had not been found, thus declining to answer; suggesting that the Maine court might
not respond to a certified question from a federal district court until that court had developed its
findings of facts).
215. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Joy, 389 A.2d 874, 882 n.7 (Md. 1978) (stating that court's
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court's statement, then the proper procedure is for the answering court to remand
to the certifying court to ascertain more facts. 216 This process preserves the
original court's status as factfinder.
Another difference arises among state certification procedures over the
inclusion of a statement of facts with a certified question. Seven states do not
specifically provide in their statute or rule that a statement of facts be included
in the certification order.21 7 Two of those states, however - Indiana and
Mississippi - always include the statement in certification cases anyway.
21 8
D. Preparation of Certification Order
Section 4 of the U.L.A. sets forth the procedure to be followed once the
contents of the certification order have been agreed to by the parties or prepared
by the court. 2 9 This process entails a formal request from the certifying court
to the receiving (i.e., answering) court. 220 The receiving court may request other




E. Costs of Certification
Section 5222 calls for an equal division of the costs between the parties unless
otherwise ordered by the certifying court. 223 The standard fee ranges from $50
to $100.224
function was not to evaluate or to weigh evidence, but to accept statement of facts submitted by
certifying court); see also Coastal Petroleum, 489 F.2d at 780 (same). But cf. Trail Builders Supply
Co. v. Reagan, 235 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1970) (adding fact from record not included in certificate
of appellate judge).
216. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
217. The states are Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Idaho. See
Appendix part B.
218. See, e.g., Barnes v. A.H. Robbins Co., 476 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. 1985); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Tallent, 445 N.E.2d 990 (Ind. 1983); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind.
1981); Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1977); Sidle v. Majors, 341 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 1976);
Wecker v. Kilmer, 294 N.E.2d 132 (Ind. 1973); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So.
2d 1002 (Miss. 1984); Jones v. Harris, 460 So. 2d 120 (Miss. 1984); Nelson v. James, 435 So. 2d
1189 (Miss. 1983); Deville Furniture Co. v. Jesco, Inc. 423 So. 2d 1337 (Miss. 1982); Anderson v.
Jackson Mun. Airport Auth., 419 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Drummond, 419 So.
2d 154 (Miss. 1982).
219. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 4, 12 U.L.A. 54 (1967). Section 4 reads:
The certification order shall be prepared by the certifying court, signed by the judge
presiding at the hearing, and forwarded to the [Supreme Court] by the clerk of the
certifying court under its official seal. The [Supreme Court] may require the original
or copies of all or of any portion of the record before the certifying court to be filed
with the certification order, if, in the opinion of the [Supreme Court], the record or
portion thereof may be necessary in answering the questions.
Id.
220. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 7.
221. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 4, 12 U.L.A. 54 (1967).
222. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 5, 12 U.L.A. 54 (1967). Section 5 reads:
"Fees and costs shall be the same as in [civil appeals] docketed before the [Supreme Court] and
shall be equally divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court in its
order of certification." Id.
223. The Maryland Court of Appeals, which acts pursuant to a statute similar to the U.L.A.,
appears not only to have divided costs equally, but also to have assessed costs to one party in some
cases. Whether the Maryland court acted pursuant to direction from the certifying court is unclear.
See Toll v. Moreno, 397 A.2d 1009, 1019 (Md. 1979) (assessing cost only to appellant without
explanation); Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 378 A.2d 1100, 1104 (Md. 1977) (same).
224. Telephone interviews with Clerks of Court, supra notes 128-31.
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Certification of Questions of Law
F. Briefs and Arguments
Section 6225 provides that local rules and statutes govern the briefs filed and
arguments heard before the answering court. Generally, any briefs or arguments
must relate to the question of law presented in the certificate.
226
G. Opinion
Section 7 states that the answering court shall write an opinion regarding
the law to be applied to the certified question, and that the clerk of the answering
court shall send copies of the opinion to the certifying court and to the parties.
227
Experience shows that answering courts treat these as formal opinions and report
them in their state reporters, much like ordinarily decided cases. 22 Thus, the
opinion becomes binding precedent. 229 It serves as res judicata regarding the
parties, thus ensuring more equitable judicial decisions230 and distinguishing the
response to certified questions from an advisory opinion.
231
Most certifying courts phrase their questions to allow and encourage a simple
affirmative or negative response; nonetheless the answering court usually offers
an explanation with its response. 23 2 Although the language of the U.L.A. supplies
no discretion to reformulate or add to the certified questions, federal courts
225. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 6, 12 U.L.A. 54 (1967). Section 6 reads:
"Proceedings in the [Supreme Court] shall be those provided in [local rules or statutes governing
briefs and arguments]." Id.
226. See, e.g., Toll, 397 A.2d at 1015 (excluding defendant's arguments falling outside scope of
question presented). But cf. Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 297 A.2d 721, 725-26 (Md. 1972)
(assuming arguendo that defendant's argument fell within scope of question certified); In re Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 334 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa 1983) (responding to matters raised
outside of certificate). One potential problem is that a lawyer may find himself or herself with a
request for argument in a state of which he or she is not a member of the Bar. Whether the lawyer
would be allowed to appear in the case rests within the discretion of the answering court or in accord
with local rule or statute. This problem can be remedied either by the attorney petitioning to argue
the case pro hac vice, or by employing local counsel.
227. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 7, 12 U.L.A. 55 (1967). Section 7 reads:
"The written opinion of the Supreme Court stating the law governing the questions certified shall
be sent by the clerk under the seal of the Supreme Court to the certifying court and to the parties."
Id. (emphasis added). One wonders whether the emphasized language limits the receiving court's
ability to reshape or reformulate the issues presented in the certificate. Receiving courts have taken
the liberty of refraining certified questions, and some certifying courts explicitly allow the receiving
court to do so in its certificate to the receiving court. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text
(stating that answering courts reframe questions after an analysis of the record or to clarify poor
phraseology).
228. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 7.
229. See id. (stating that opinion becomes part of common law of state); see also Wolner v.
Mahaska Indus., Inc., 325 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1982) (holding its decisions on certified questions
to be binding precedent applicable in all future cases involving same legal issue, until overruled); In
re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 354 (Wash. 1968) (same). But cf. Miree v. United States, 249 S.E.2d 573,
577 (Ga. 1978) (pointing to weakness of certification because court is not deciding particular
controversy or appeal from lower court in jurisdiction; thus, precedent is not necessarily binding on
certifying court either in result or in application).
230. Letter from Jack Davies, Minnesota State Senator, to Victoria Doran (July 11, 1985).
Minnesota made one minor change from the U.L.A. When adopting its statute, it added in its
Section 7 that the opinion shall be res judicata regarding the parties. This, says Davies, made explicit
what was implicit in the U.L.A. and was added to ensure more just judicial decisions. Id.
231. In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966).
232. See United States v. 19.7 Acres of Land, 692 P.2d 809, 811 (Wash. 1984) (stating that short
answer is negative, but feeling necessity to explain in order to place answer in perspective, as case
was one of first impression).
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often explicitly allow responding state courts to answer presented questions as a
"comprehensive whole or in subordinate or even contingent parts.''233 The ability
to reshape the issues encompassed in the certified questions is important to the
goals of the certification process, because it allows state courts to retain control
over the direction and development of their own law.
H. Power to Certify
Section 8234 provides for interstate certification. It empowers the enacting
state to certify a question of another state's law, arising in a conflict-of-laws
case, to the highest court of that other state for a response. 235 The discussion of
the meaning of Section 1 applies equally to Section 8.236 The Commissioners
employed language identical to that in Section 1 for courts to determine certifiable
issues and the appropriateness of certification. 237
This provision sparked a major discussion at the 1966 National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 231 Opponents of interstate certification
felt that including the provision would further impede passage of the entire
U.L.A. in state legislatures. 239 They maintained that inconsistent results might
occur,2' ° and that the costs (in terms of both time and money for the litigants
and congested dockets for the courts) would be dramatically greater than those
involved in federal-to-state certification . 4  These dissidents also argued that
intermediate-appellate-court certification would further clog dockets, so they
should not be allowed to certify.
242
233. Martinez v. Rodriguez, 394 F.2d 156, 159 n.6 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Meckert v. Transa-
merican Ins. Co., 742 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984) (giving Idaho court discretion to reframe issues).
234. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 8, 12 U.L.A. 55 (1967). Section 8 reads:
The [Supreme Court] [or the intermediate appellate courts] of this state, on [its]
[their] own motion or the motion of any party, may order certification of questions of
law to the highest court of any state when it appears to the certifying court that there
are involved in any proceeding before the court questions of law of the receiving state
which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and it
appears to the certifying court that there are no controlling precedents in the decisions
of the highest court or intermediate appellate courts of the receiving state.
Id.
235. -Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 8, Commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 55
(1975). Section 8 is the reciprocal provision to the bracketed provision of Section 1. See supra note
99 and accompanying text (noting that bracketed portions of Section 1 allow option to answer
certified questions from state courts).
236. See supra notes 99-187 and accompanying text (discussing Section 1 power-to-answer provi-
sions and standards).
237. Compare text accompanying supra note 100 (providing text of Section 1) with supra note
234 (providing text of Section 8).
238. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 8.
239. Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 5. To allay this fear, the Commission agreed to bracket
the relevant portion of Section 1 and all of Sections 8 and 9. Id.
240. Id. The comment was made that lawyers from one state would be briefing and possibly
arguing in another state, in which they would have no familiarity with the state law, particularly
with the lower level court decisions. Id.
241. Id. The likelihood of the necessity of hiring in-state counsel increases, and can be both
complicated and costly. Id.
242. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing Commissioners' decision to accept
ALI recommendation that certification should be limited to highest court of state and that certification
from intermediate appellate courts should be in discretion of enacting states). The decision to include
the intermediate appellate courts makes this the reciprocal provision of the bracketed language of
Section 1.
Certification of Questions of Law
While federal-court power to certify stems from the inherent powers possessed
by federal courts, the highest and intermediate-appellate state courts must adopt
Section 8 or its equivalent in order to participate in interstate certification. 243
Specifically, most state courts derive jurisdiction directly from their constitutions.
Thus, they lack the inherent powers of federal courts. 244 However, some state
constitutions may permit certification of questions of law to another state without
enactment of this U.L.A. section, 245 because those state constitutions do not
restrict giving opinions to other courts.
The ambiguity of the Section 8 language poses great problems in interstate
certification, especially when further compounded by court use of the renvoi
doctrine.m At a minimum, a three-tiered inquiry must occur to determine the
appropriateness of certification in an interstate situation. The first element requires
that the conflict-of-laws rules of the certifying state refer that state court to the
law of another state. Otherwise, no issue for certification exists. Second, the
U.L.A. allows certification only if the answering state's law is unclear and the
answer to the certified question may be determinative of the cause of action.
247
Third, the certifying state may be referred to an answering state that employs
the renvoi doctrine, at least for some purposes, thus potentially referring the
question back to the law of the certifying state, or to the law of yet another
state.
The delays inherent in this process, particularly in renvoi situations, might
be seen to outweigh the advantages of certification, thus accounting for the
absence of interstate-certification cases. Because certification requires unclear
state law, it would be difficult for the certifying judge to know whether the
answer to the question posed will be determinative of the cause. Indeed, the law
must be unclear for proper certification, and when a possibility of reference to
the law of a third jurisdiction exists - which conceivably could warrant a second
certification - the difficulties increase. Presumably, most judges would choose
to avoid the mire of interstate certification by simply deciding the case with
either the forum's law or a guess as to the other jurisdiction's undecided law.
The arguments presented in the foregoing paragraph are speculative only,
for instances of renvoi are relatively rare, particularly when it comes to invoking
the law of a third jurisdiction. More importantly, intelligent use of interstate
certification can serve to eliminate, rather than exacerbate, problems in the use
of the renvoi doctrine. Instead of having the forum court try to predict what the
foreign court would do had the case been filed in that jurisdiction, there can be
243. Telephone interview with John McCabe, Legislative Director and Legal Counsel, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (June 21, 1985).
244. See infra notes 263-82 and accompanying text (discussing methods of enactment of certifi-
cation procedures and constitutional challenges thereto).
245. Id.
246. Renvoi deals with whether, when one state is referred by its choice-of-law process to the law
of another state, the referral is to the internal, or dispositive, law of the state only or instead to the
whole law, which includes the choice-of-law process of that state. See Comment, supra note 89.
247. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967). This is a confusing
standard in and of itself. See supra Part II A 2 b (discussing guidelines for when state court will
answer and concluding that various states treat the "may be determinative" language as setting
different standards).
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a determinative ruling from the foreign court itself. The metaphysics of renvoi
disappear and an actual ruling from the foreign court is obtained.
248
I. Procedure for State Certification
Section 9249 of the U.L.A. calls for the interstate-certification procedure to
be determined by the laws of the receiving state. This section, as with Section 8,
is bracketed, to denote optional, but encouraged adoption.
J. Boilerplate
The remaining sections2 0 of the U.L.A. outline standard provisions of most
uniform laws, although one of the elements in each of the sections constituted a
major topic of discussion at the 1966 Conference. Each section contains the
bracketed terms "[Act] [Rule]" to accommodate the differences among the states'
practices governing appellate procedure. 25' In some states, statutes control court
procedure, while in others the rulemaking power of the highest state court governs
appellate procedure. 25 2 The Commissioners decided to put both terms in brackets
to show recognition of this situation and to allow the individual states to choose
accordingly.
253
Sections 10 through 13 of the U.L.A. are self-explanatory. Section 10254
provides a severability clause so that, if a court finds one portion of the Act
invalid, the rest remains in force. Section 11 is important because it dictates that
the Act as a whole should be construed to make uniform the law of the states
that enact it. 25s One of the primary goals of the Erie doctrine was to harmonize
the decisionmaking in federal and state courts, in order to discourage forum
shopping. Interstate choice of law similarly seeks to promote uniformity.
25 6
248. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 10, at 431-33.
249. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 9, 12 U.L.A. 56 (1967). Section 9 reads:
"The procedures for certification from this state to the receiving state shall be those provided in the
laws of the receiving state." Id.
250. Id. §§ 10-13.
Section 10 [Severability].
If any provision of this [Act] [Rule] or the application thereof to any person, court,
or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or
applications of the [Act] [Rule] which can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to this end the provisions of this [Act] [Rule] are severable.
Section II [Construction].
This [Act] [Rule] shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it.
Section 12 [Short Title].
This [Act] [Rule] may be cited as the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
[Act] [Rule].
Section 13 [Time of Taking Effect].
This [Act] [Rule] shall take effect
Id.
251. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 9.
252. See infra notes 263-82 and accompanying text (describing two possible methods of enactment
of certification procedure).
253. Transcript of 1966, supra note 19, at 9.
254. See supra note 250 (providing text of Section 10).
255. See supra note 250 (providing text of Section 11).
256. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, Commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A.
51 (1975) (stating that "[c]ertification involves ... the relationship between states. Therefore, it
would seem to be eminently desirable that uniformity be achieved in this area").
Certification of Questions of Law
Section 12 states how the Act should be cited.257 Section 13, which specifies
the date of enactment, was added at the conclusion of the 1967 Conference at
the suggestion of one of the Commissioners.2"'
III. METHOD OF ENACTMENT
Prior to the enactment of the U.L.A., some commentators suggested that
state enabling acts might provide the basis for a certification procedure. 2 9 Others
suggested that the procedure could be initiated by congressional action. 260 In this
situation, however, Congress would probably be unable to compel state action,
particularly if the state argued that to do so would violate its constitution. 26'
Thus, the Commissioners realized that state action offered the best means of
implementing a certification procedure.
262
A. Statute
In states adopting the certification procedure by statute, the first certification
case generally arises as a constitutional challenge to the statute based on an
asserted lack of legislative power to confer such jurisdiction on the courts.
263
These cases challenge the constitutionality of certification because it calls for the
rendering of advisory opinions, violating the case-or-controversy requirement.
264
However, state courts usually discuss the constitutionality of the statute even if
not directly challenged.
265
Thus far, the statutes challenged have been upheld, with one notable excep-
tion,266 perhaps due to the general principle that statutes, wherever possible, should
257. See supra note 250 (providing text of Section 12).
258. Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 56.
259. See Note, Consequences of Abstention, supra note 32, at 1369.
260. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity
Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 214 (1957); ALl STUDY, supra note 103.
261. Note, supra note 25, at 357-58.
262. As noted earlier, due to the rules governing appellate procedure in some states, some state
legislatures can implement a procedure by statute, while other states require a court rule. See supra
notes 251-53 and accompanying text (describing differences between states on issue of what body
may enact such a procedure).
263. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961); In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 354-
58 (Wash. 1968).
264. See, e.g., Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 742-43 (Fla. 1961) (stating that "in
the absence of a constitutional provision expressly or by necessary implication limiting the jurisdiction
of the [Florida] Supreme Court to those matters expressly conferred upon it . . . [or] expressly
conferring upon another court jurisdiction to exercise the judicial power [with respect to certification]
.. . such power may be granted to this court."); In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 354-58 (Wash. 1968)
(dealing extensively with issue of whether such statute could impose upon court duty to render
advisory opinions).
265. See, e.g., Miree v. United States, 249 S.E.2d 573, 578 (1978) (noting that "[wle do not
decide here whether or not Code Ann. § 24-3902 is constitutional, but merely note that in adopting
that Act, which was approved by the Governor, both other branches of state government have called
upon this court to serve in such instances"); Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149,
151 (Kan. 1980) (stating that "[t]his question arises from an actual case and controversy and although
presented as a question of law, it neither violates the [state constitutional] case and controversy
requirement nor the separation of powers doctrine on advisory opinions").
266. See Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co., No. 72650, (Mo. July 13, 1990) (finding
no constitutional jurisdiction permitting court to respond to certified question under state statute and
thus declining to answer question froni United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit).
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be construed as in keeping with the state constitution u 7 Typically, in those states
requiring statutory action, the constitutions do not prohibit the legislature from
conferring additional jurisdictional power upon the appellate courts. 261 After en-
actment, the court often supplements the statute with a court rule specifying the
mechanics of the certification procedure. 269
B. Court Rule
Many states have adopted the U.L.A. or its equivalent by court rule alone.
2 70
Generally, the appropriate court learns of the U.L.A. from the state's law-
revision commission, the permanent rules advisory committee,2 7' or the state-
federal judicial council, 272 which then sponsors adoption of the certification
procedure by the court. Other states have state uniform-laws commissions that
urge passage of uniform acts within the state.
27
1
Nevertheless, adoption by court rule does not preclude the inevitable consti-
tutional challenge to the U.L.A. 214 While most states have upheld the constitu-
tionality of their court rules, Utah held its rule unconstitutional. 27 The Utah
Supreme Court found the certification rule unconstitutional under Article 8 of
the Utah Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that "in other cases the
[Utah] Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only. ' 276 In the absence
of the word "only," enlargement of appellate jurisdiction by court rule or statute
could be construed. 27 Its presence, however, combined with the fact that certi-
fication was not among the writs over which the court has original jurisdiction,
27
1
267. See Sun Ins. Office, 133 So. 2d at 742-43 (finding that legislature has constitutional power
to broaden court jurisdiction); In re Elliott, 446 P.2d at 352 (same). Cf. Miree, 249 S.E.2d at 578
(stating that, since both other branches of government called upon courts to act on certified questions,
courts will accept responsibility).
268. Memorandum of New York Law Revision Commission Relating to Certification of Questions
of Law to the Court of Appeals, Leg. Doc. (1985) No. 65[BJ, at 9. States that have adopted
certification procedure by statute include Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix part B.
269. These states include Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, New
Hampshire, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix part B.
270. These states include Colorado, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
North Dakota, and Rhode Island. See infra Appendix part B. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
also falls into this category. Id.
271. See Letter from Joel Selig, Professor of Law, University of Wyoming, to Victoria Doran
(June 12, 1985).
272. Letter from James Fullin, Executive Secretary, Wisconsin Judicial Council, to Victoria Doran
(June 24, 1985).
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Idaho
1983) (holding - over a vigorous dissent - that court possesses inherent power to decide Idaho
law); In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 832 (Me. 1966) (concluding that ability to receive and answer
certified questions was more than an advisory function); Irion v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 199,
203 (Mont. 1969) (summarily affirming authority to answer certified questions and appropriateness
in this context).
275. Holden v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 428, 432 (Utah 1981).
276. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (emphasis added); see also FLORIDA CONST. art. V, §§ 3-4.
277. Holden, 629 P.2d at 430.
278. The writs over which the court has original jurisdiction are mandamus, certiorari, prohibition,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4. This is in contrast to the Colorado
Constitution. Its certification procedure, COLO. App. R. 21.1, was upheld as an exercise of original
jurisdiction stated in CoLo. CONST. art. VI, § 3 as the "power to issue writs ... and such other
original and remedial writs as may be provided by rule of court with authority to hear and determine
the same." Id.
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caused the Utah Supreme Court to hold the court rule violative of Article 8.279
Prior to 1973, the Alabama Constitution echoed Utah's Constitution in
granting its supreme court "appellate jurisdiction only." A 1973 amendment,
however, specifically authorized the high court to answer "questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States." 2w° Upon receipt of this jurisdictional
grant, the court promulgated the certification procedure by rule. 28' New York
also faced a similar constitutional barrier to certification and amended its con-
stitution before adopting a procedure.
2 2
IV. IMPORTANT PATTERNS - STATE VARIATIONS OF THE
UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT
A. Overview
All forty jurisdictions that have adopted some form of certification procedure
grant the power to answer certified questions only to the state's highest court
having jurisdiction over the question.32 In all of these jurisdictions, the power
to answer is discretionary,2u as is the power to certify questions. 28 s
Twelve jurisdictions have adopted statutes that are almost identical to the
U.L.A. 8 Only these jurisdictions possess both the power to answer and the
power to certify questions of law to other states. 27 Several other jurisdictions
have the power to answer questions from appellate courts of another state, but
not to certify such questions.
2 88
279. Holden, 629 P.2d at 431.
280. ALA. CoNsT. art. VI, amend. 328.
281. ALA. R. APP. P. 18.
282. See infra Part VI A (discussing New York experience in bringing about certification
procedure).
283. See infra Appendix part B.
284. See WASH. REV. CODE § 2.60.020 (1989). The language of the Washington statute states that
the court "shall render its opinion." Id. The Washington Supreme Court has ruled that this power
is discretionary. In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 353 (Wash. 1968).
285. See supra notes 108-48 and accompanying text (stating that U.L.A. makes these powers
discretionary to promote individual state autonomy and allow states to control their courts and laws).
286. These jurisdictions are Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Puerto Rico. See infra Appendix part
B. Of these twelve jurisdictions, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Puerto Rico, and Wisconsin vary from
the U.L.A. in that they will not accept certifications from the intermediate appellate court of another
state. Interestingly, however, both Kentucky and Wisconsin allow both their highest and intermediate
appellate courts to certify questions of law to other states. KY. R. Crv. P. 76.37 (1978); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 821.08 (West Supp. 1989). Massachusetts and Puerto Rico are consistent in that they allow
only their highest appellate court to certify questions, and they will not accept certifications from an
intermediate appellate court of another state. MAss. Sup. JUD. CT. R. 1:03 (1988); P.R. Sup. CT.
R. 27 (1988). West Virginia joins them, allowing only its Supreme Court of Appeals to certify
questions to other states, but West Virginia accepts certified questions from both the highest and the
intermediate appellate courts of other states. W. VA. CODE § 51-lA-I (1981).
287. All jurisdictions have the power to answer certified questions from various levels of federal
courts.
288. See ALA. R. App. P. 18 (employing language allowing certification from "a court of the
United States," thus permitting the assumption that this would include state appellate courts); MicH.
GEN. CT. R. 797.2 (employing language allowing certification from "a federal court or state appellate
court"); N.Y. RULES OF COURT § 500.17 (N.Y. Ct. App.) (McKinney rev. ed. 1986) (expressly allowing
other states to certify to New York, but providing no language for New York courts to certify
questions to other states).
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B. Power to Answer
1. Prohibitions on Accepting Certification from Particular Courts
The most common variation from Section 1 of the U.L.A. involves the
limitations that states place on the courts from which they will accept certified
questions. Eight states allow certified questions only from federal appellate
courts, 2 9 thus eliminating the federal district court as a certifying court. Seventeen
states will not allow certified questions from any state court. 2 9
The fear of inundation appears to prompt states to deny acceptance of
certified questions from federal district courts.2 9' This seems to be a perception
without basis in fact, 292 however, for as yet no state that has implemented a
certification procedure has been unduly burdened by it. 93 Other states may
hesitate because they feel that their courts will be violating state constitutional
prohibitions against issuing advisory opinions unless they answer a question based
on the fully developed facts of an appellate-level case. 294 Further, some commen-
tators believe that restricting the right of federal district courts to certify guar-
antees that only truly important cases will be eligible for certification, since the
losing party must have been willing to pursue an appeal before obtaining
certification .291
Finally, some experts believe that allowing federal district courts to certify
questions of law encourages forum shopping in states that do not have intrastate
certification statutes. 296 Litigants without the option of certification in a state
trial court might have an incentive to take cases into federal court, 297 thus
engendering state answers to questions of law without following the prescribed
path through the state-court system.
In contrast, some courts interpret their certification statute or rule in a
sufficiently broad manner so as to accept certified questions from courts that are
not explicitly noted in their authorizing statute or rule. For example, Massachu-
setts and Rhode Island have accepted certified questions from United States
289. These states are Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, and
Wisconsin. See infra Appendix part B.
290. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island,
and Wyoming. See infra Appendix part B.
291. See Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 870 (asserting that to allow
federal district courts to certify may overburden state courts).
292. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text (stating that deluge is not a real problem
because certification is not often used and because courts give such questions priority).
293. See generally Corr & Robbins, supra note 10, at 447-58.
294. ALI STUDY, supra note 103, at 294.
295. Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 870. See also Letter from Thomas
Shriner, Esq. to Marilyn Graves, Clerk of Wisconsin Supreme Court (Apr. 19, 1982). This has
serious consequences, however, since costs and delay to litigants would be greater. Further, no
guarantee exists that only important matters will be appealed. Some parties may choose not to pursue
an appeal for reasons having no relation to the importance of the issues. Others may try to entangle
the opposition with the delay of appeal raising issues having little or no merit.
296. See Comment, Abstention and Certification, supra note 32, at 870.
297. Id.
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bankruptcy courts. 29 As discussed earlier, important reasons exist for allowing
federal district-court certification to state courts.
299
2. Type of Question Certifiable - Question(s) (or Propositions) of Law that
"Is [Are] Determinative" vs. "May Be Determinative"
Seven states employ the following variation of U.L.A. Section 1: "question[s]
[or propositions] of law which [is] [are] determinative of the [cause] [case]. ''3°
Obviously, a state that uses the "is determinative" phrase would accept fewer
certified questions than a state that uses the "may be determinative" language.
Any situation in which the court doubts the determinative effect of its decision
becomes ripe for refusal to answer. Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court has
answered certified questions in cases that evidently necessited further resolution
of legal issues in the federal court.3°0 On the other hand, perhaps this variation
in language only reflects one alternative attempt to express the requisite that the
answer to the state-law question must resolve the factual dispute in the federal
court. Such a reason for the phraseology would render the difference in language
meaningless. When strictly construed, however, the more obligatory language
may inhibit federal-court certification.
30 2
3. The Standard - "No Controlling Precedent" vs. "No Clear Controlling
Precedent" in the Highest and/or Intermediate Appellate Courts
Seven jurisdictions use the "no clear controlling precedent" language, 3 '
while the others use the U.L.A. language of "no controlling precedent."
3 °4
298. See Colonial Tavern, Inc. v. Boston Licensing Bd., 425 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1981); In re
Shepard Co., 342 A.2d 918 (R.I. 1975). But cf. In re Hartman Paving, Inc., 745 F.2d 307 (4th Cir.
1984) (denying plaintiff's motion for certification presented to bankruptcy judge on ground that West
Virginia lacked precedent on point).
299. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text (stating that such certification is important
to resolve major issues early in litigation, to avoid loss of decision when party fails to appeal, and
to provide uniformity and fair judicial decisions).
300. Compare Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico (see infra
Appendix part 1E) with Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967) (stating
that question of law is certifiable if it "may be determinative of the cause"). See also IDAHO APP.
R. 12.1 (stating that for question of law to be certifiable it must be "a controlling question of law
in the pending action in the U.S. court as to which there is no controlling precedent"); MONT. R.
APP. R. 44(a) (using standard that question is certifiable if "controlling question of Montana law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" is at issue).
The difference between "question(s) of law" versus "question(s) or proposition(s) of law" has
not been judicially construed, nor is any difference readily apparent.
301. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (stating that certified questions and
hence proceeding before it do not concern resolution of constitutionality of statute). But cf. Greene v.
Massey, 384 So. 2d 24, 27-28 (Fla. 1980) (withholding answer to United States Court of Appeals
regarding criminal reversal "in the interests of justice," since its response would not be determinative
of cause). The decision in Greene may suggest that, when the state court wishes to avoid an answer,
it will choose to interpret the language in a strict manner. Id.
302. See Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1242 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980) (declining
to certify question to Mississippi because of that state's more restrictive "is determinative" language
in case where state-law issue "might" or "might not" be dispositive) (emphasis in original), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981).
303. The states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Louisiana, and Mississippi. See
Appendix part B. The only difference between this list and that of the states employing the "is
determinative" language is the substitution of Maine for New Mexico. See supra note 300 (listing
jurisdictions using "is determinative" language).
304. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967). But see HAw. REV.
STAT. § 602-5(2) (1985) (not stating standard); P.R. SuP. CT. R. 27 (1988) ("no clear precedents").
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Further, seventeen jurisdictions require only that this equivalent standard be
applied to the decisions of the highest court of the state, rather than to decisions
of the highest and intermediate appellate courts of the state. 0 5
On the whole, the "no clear controlling precedent" language appears to be
much broader than the U.L.A.'s "no controlling precedent" term, thus allowing
a greater number of certified questions. The language seems to go well beyond
authorizing certification of undecided state-law questions, because the law can
be well-settled despite the absence of "clear controlling precedents." Moreover,
confining the standard to the decisions of the highest state court goes against
the rule that binds federal courts by the intermediate appellate-court decisions of
the state in which they sit.? 6
In addition, one commentator has argued that certification "should be used
only in situations of genuine perplexity concerning state law; it must not become
a substitute for conscientious and independent federal adjudication.' '307 The
criticism is that the broader language may encourage federal courts to certify,
rather than to deal with difficult questions of law. While it is not clear that this
possiblity would actually occur in practice,3 °0 the potential could be eliminated
by amending these statutes and rules to conform with the U.L.A.
C. Power to Certify
Half of the jurisdictions that permit certification lack a provision authorizing
their courts to certify questions of law to the court of another state.3°9 This
presents a serious problem to the resolution of conflict-of-laws issues by any
means other than judicial speculation when faced with unclear law in the
applicable state.3 10 No legislative history explicitly suggests why these states chose
to forego the opportunity to handle choice-of-law problems through certification.
The U.L.A. decision to make adoption of Sections 8 and 9, as well as the
applicable bracketed language in Section 1, optional may account for some of
the nonuse.31' Indeed, because many people consider the U.L.A. to be a mech-
anism to combat the Erie problem, 1 2 perhaps these states envision certification
305. The jurisdictions are Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico,
Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix part B.
306. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940). The federal court may even be
bound by the reported trial-court decisions in this context. Id. at 178-79.
307. Note, Consequences of Abstention, supra note 32, at 1368.
308. A reading of the case law in these states does not reveal any practical impact on the states'
use of the procedure. States having the narrower U.L.A. language appear to have received a similar
amount of certified questions as those states having the broader "no clear controlling precedents"
standard.
309. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix part B. Three of these states
- Alabama, Michigan, and New York - do have the power to receive questions from state courts,
but they do not have the power to pose them. Why these states made this choice is unclear.
310. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (noting conflict-of-laws problems and fact that
certification assists in resolving them, such that when certification is unavailable, courts must guess
as to the applicable law).
311. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (discussing optional nature of these sections
and reasons Commissioners decided to allow option).
312. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text (discussing Erie problems and how Commis-
sioners sought to remedy them through enactment of U.L.A.).
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as an accommodation only to federal courts, rather than to other states as well.
At the time of adoption of the U.L.A., the Commissioners encountered
resistance to the idea of certification. This attitude stemmed from suspicion of
the process and some strange perceptions in state legislatures. 13 While the Act
gives states the opportunity to preserve their own lawmaking powers, the general
viewpoint among the states seems to be one of abdicating power, and of federal
encroachment.31 4 States fear that somehow certification might weaken their role
or abrogate their constitutional responsibilities." Ironically, the Act intends just
the opposite.
31 6
V. ACTUAL OPERATION OF CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE
Twenty-six of the forty jurisdictions that have adopted a certification pro-
cedure have done so since 1975.1 17 The number of certified questions is also on
the rise."' Support for the procedure has increased in the past decade. 19 In
February 1983, for example, the American Bar Association's Special Committee
on Coordination of Federal Judicial Improvements resolved to:
(a) [urge] each state to adopt a procedure whereby the highest court of the state
may answer a question of state law certified from an Article III court of the
United States, when the answer will be controlling in an action in the certifying
court and cannot in the opinion of the certifying court be satisfactorily determined
in light of state authorities; [and]
(b) [urge] the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to review the U.L.A. in
light of the experience since 1967 to determine whether revisions are appropriate11°
Declarations like this one - as well, perhaps, as renewed attention by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws - may provide the incentive for the
remaining jurisdictions lacking certification to adopt the procedure. It would be
unfortunate if jurisdictions refrained from adopting good certification procedures
- or, indeed, any certification procedure at all - simply due to continued
misperceptions and unwarranted fears. 21
313. See infra notes 390-417 and accompanying text (describing enactment of certification pro-
cedure in Connecticut and perception by legislature that state would lose control over cases before
its courts and be faced with deluge of new cases).
314. Telephone interview with John McCabe, Legislative Director and Legal Counsel, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (June 21, 1985).
315. Id.
316. Id. (responding to assertion that U.L.A. actually provides states more power, Mr. McCabe
stated that "[wihat's obvious isn't as obvious as it always ought to be").
317. The jurisdictions are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix part B.
318. See Corr & Robbins supra note 10, at 420 (surveying judges with questionnaire on various
certification issues and reporting that judges currently are experiencing rise in number of certified
questions).
319. Swegle, supra note 116, at 5; SERON, supra note 31, at 2.
320. Report with Recommendations, American Bar Association Report to the House of Delegates
Special Committee on Coordination of Federal Judicial Improvements (Feb. 1983).
321. Telephone interview with John McCabe, Legislative Director and Legal Counsel, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (June 21, 1985).
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Even with this increase in support for certification, no reported case has
utilized interstate certification to resolve a conflict-of-laws situation. This total
absence perhaps should not be surprising, given that only twelve states possess
interstate certification power, 22 and because a state court must address several
threshold issues before being able to find an appropriate case for certification.
A court wishing to certify, for example, must initially determine that the suit in
question poses a real conflict-of-laws question. 23 Then the court must ensure
that the issues presented meet the standard required for certification.3 24 Faced
with amorphous choice-of-law rules, and, hence, difficult and time-consuming
analysis, judges may feel justified in using forum law (or that of a third
jurisdiction) when no law exists in the proper jurisdiction.
325
Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding predictions of "determinativeness,"
as required by the U.L.A.,3 26 offers another motivation, based on ease of
application, for judges to "predict" another state's law or to use the law of
their own jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the "may be determinative" language
of Section 8 receives a universally liberal construction, potential certifying courts
may incline toward interstate certification because they would no longer feel
hampered by trying to make impossible predictions about determinativeness. The
adoption and use of interstate certification would increase and would dramatically
impact the uniform development of the law, as well as comity among the states.
3 27
The achievement of these ends will not be an easy task. Problems on both
procedural and substantive levels are encountered when a state contemplates
adoption of a certification statute. The enactment process itself poses numerous
obstacles, including constitutional issues. The experiences of New York and
Connecticut illustrate these problems.
VI. ENACTING STATE CERTIFICATION: THE EXPERIENCES OF NEW
YORK AND CONNECTICUT
A. New York: The Process of Enacting a State Certification Statute
The idea for a certification procedure in New York was first brought to the
attention of Assemblyman Edward Griffith in early 1982 by his legislative
assistant, John Halloran, who was a law student at Albany Law School.
3 2
322. See supra note 286. Conversations with various clerks of court indicate that most of them
remain unaware that their states could accept or certify questions from another state.
323. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (stating elements for existence of conflict-of-
laws situation and that such element must be met to give rise to need for interstate certification).
324. See supra notes 118-27 & 165-87 and accompanying text (setting forth standard for certifi-
cation under U.L.A. Section 1 to require no controlling precedent in the answering jurisdiction and
that answer to questions may be determinative of cause in certifying court).
325. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (describing difficulties with choice-of-law
situations and stating that these problems provide impetus for judges to apply their own law because
of convenience and belief that it is superior).
326. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (relating "may be determinative" standard
for certification and stating that such standard offers limited guidance).
327. See supra notes 31-60 & 234-48 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of interstate
certification as being authoritative resolution of legal questions, comity, and reduction of judicial
guesswork).
328. Telephone interview with Terrence O'Neill, Counsel to Assemblyman Edward Griffith (June 21,
1984). Accord Telephone interview with Jay Cox O'Brien, Assistant Director, New York Law Revision
Commission (June 11, 1985) (stating that the bill had been introduced by Mr. Griffith's office before
the Law Revision Commission had become involved in assisting in its passage.)
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Halloran's conflict-of-laws class raised the certification issue; he proposed that
the Assemblyman submit a bill in the New York State Legislature to allow for
a certification statute, coupled with court-made rules.3 29 The bill's stated purposes
- reducing Erie problems, encouraging comity, and allowing individual states to
control development of their own laws - echoed those that prompted the Uniform
Commissioners to adopt the U.L.A.330
1. History of A5453, the 1985 Bill that Called for a Constitutional
Amendment to Allow for Certification of Questions of Law in New York
On March 2, 1982, Assemblyman Griffith first introduced Assembly Bill
10676 - the predecessor to A5453 - in the New York Assembly.33  The bill
soon caught the attention of New York's Law Revision Commission, and Assem-
blyman Griffith agreed to allow the Commission to assume sponsorship and
drafting responsibilities.
33 2
But Joseph Bellacosa, then Clerk of the New York Court of Appeals, the
state's highest court, quickly registered the Court of Appeals' opposition to the
bill. 33 He stressed that enactment of a certification procedure in New York
required a constitutional amendment to Article VI, Section 3 of the New York
State Constitution.33 4 That section provides, in relevant part, that the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals "shall be limited to the review of questions of law" in
certain enumerated cases.335 No portion of the section encompassed the power to
answer a question of law certified to the New York Court of Appeals from
another court. The New York Legislature "does not possess inherent power to
329. Telephone interview with Terrence O'Neill, Counsel to Assemblyman Edward Griffith (June 21,
1984).
330. See supra Part I (detailing purposes behind U.L.A.).
331. Telephone interview with Terrence O'Neill, Counsel to Assemblyman Edward Griffith (June
21, 1984). Assembly Bill 10676 read:
Rulemaking power of the court of appeals with respect to matters before certain federal
courts. The court of appeals may adopt and from time to time amend a rule to permit
the court of appeals to answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court
of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia, or a three judge district court of the United States, when
requested by the certifying court if there are no, involved in any proceeding before it,
questions of law of the State of New York which may be determinative of the cause
then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court
there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the court of appeals of New York.
A10676 (1984).
332. Telephone interview with Terrence O'Neill, Counsel to Assemblyman Edward Griffith (June
21, 1984); Telephone interview with Jay Cox O'Brien, Assistant Director, New York Law Revision
Commission (June 11, 1985). The involvement of the Law Revision Commission (L.R.C.) marked
the reopening of a study of certification by a L.R.C. research consultant, completed in 1966. See
Richard B. Lillich, Federal Courts: State Legislation Relating to Abstention When Points of Local
Law Must Be Decided (1966) (favoring adoption of certification procedure, but resulting in no
acti6n). See also Memorandum of L.R.C. Relating to Certification of Questions of Law to the Court
of Appeals for 1984 and 1985 Legislatures, at 2 [hereinafter Law Revision Commission Memorandum).
333. Letter from Joseph Bellacosa, Clerk, New York Court of Appeals, to John Halloran (Mar. 2,
1982).
334. Id. A constitutional amendment in New York requires that the amendment pass two separately
elected legislatures and that it be presented to and passed by the general electorate in the first general
election following the amendment's second passage by the legislature. N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1985)
(amending scope of power of state judiciary).
335. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 3 (1962).
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expand the Court [of Appeals' jurisdictional] powers," 33 6 and the powers of the
court stem entirely from New York's Constitution. 37 Thus, for the court to
obtain the expanded jurisdiction for certification required a constitutional amend-
ment.3
The Law Revision Commission amended A10676 in accordance with Clerk
Bellacosa's suggestion.3 9 The amendment to the bill simply called for a consti-
tutional amendment to Section 3, rather than for a statutory change to the
Judiciary Law or a textual alteration of the bill.3 40
After the decision in March 1982 to amend the constitution, the legislature
solicited comments from interested groups. 34' In April 1982, Sol Wachtler, Judge
of the New York Court of Appeals and Chairman of the New York State-Federal
Judicial Council, expressed the Court of Appeals' unanimous support for passage
of the certification bill. 342 Research fails to disclose why the Court of Appeals
underwent this change of heart.
34
After the arrival of the new legislature, elected in November 1982, the
Judiciary Committee in 1983 reported Assembly Bill 2229 on certification. 3" The
text of A2229a45 differed from that of A10676(b) in two significant respects.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Law Revision Commission Memorandum, supra note 332, at 9-10; HENRY COHEN
& ARTHUR KARGER, THE POWERS OF Tm NEw YORK COURT OF APPEALS 7-8 (1952).
339. Memorandum in Support of Legislation for Bill Number 10676-b [hereinafter Memorandum,
Bill 10676-b]; see also Letter from John Halloran to Joseph Bellacosa, Clerk, New York Court of
Appeals (Apr. 29, 1982).
340. Memorandum, Bill 10676-b, supra note 339.
341. Comments received either disapproved or offered no position. See New York County Lawyers'
Association's Report on Proposed Legislation Allowing the Court of Appeals to Answer Questions
of Law Certified to it by Specified Federal Courts (Sept. 1983); Report Re: Certification of Questions
of Law to the New York Court of Appeals, Democratic Study Group [hereinafter Democratic Study
Group Report].
342. Letter from Sol Wachtler, Judge, New York Court of Appeals, to Gordon Howe, II,
Assistant Counsel to Senate Majority Leader (Apr. 27, 1984); see also Law Revision Commission
Memorandum, supra note 332, at 12.
343. See supra note 333 and accompanying text (stating opposition by New York Court of Appeals
to certification).
344. See Democratic Study Group Report, supra note 341; Letter from Ian Clements to Victoria
Doran (July 18, 1985). The legislative history of certification in New York may be traced as follows:
1983
5/31: Assembly concurs with Senate amendment, A8860 repassed. A2229 (same
resolution) as A8860 was reported from Judiciary Committee; passed Assembly; died
in Senate Judiciary Committee.
1984
1/24: S7316 (Douglas Barclay Sponsor) introduced.








345. The text of A2229, which was the same as A8860, read in relevant part:
The court of appeals shall adopt and from time to time may amend a rule to permit
the court to answer questions of New York law certified to it by the Supreme Court
of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States or an appellate court of
Certification of Questions of Law
First, A2229 omitted the language allowing the New York Court of Appeals to
answer questions of law certified to it from the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals or a three-judge district court of the United States.31 Instead, the new
bill allowed the New York Court of Appeals to answer questions of law certified
to it from "an appellate court of another state." 47 Second, A2229 changed the
standard for accepting certification from one in which the certifying court sought
controlling precedent only in the New York Court of Appeals, to one in which
the certifying court looked for controlling precedent in the decisions of any court
of New York.
3 48
Although A2229 died in the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1983, the Assem-
bly passed the same resolution in early 1984, prior to the election changing
legislatures.3 49 Almost simultaneously with that passage by the committee, Judge
Wachtler suggested that the language of the bill regarding answering questions
of law be altered from "appellate court[s] of another state" to "an appellate
court of last resort of another state. ' 350 On May 29, 1984, the Senate passed
S7316, which incorporated Judge Wachtler's suggestion; two days later, the
Assembly repassed A8860 to conform to the Senate version.3 51
The initiative thus passed the 1982 legislature. The constitutional amendment
could not yet be presented for voter approval, however, because the New York
Constitution still required repassage of the bill by a separately elected legislature.3
2
Using the requisite identical language, the initiative obtained the approval of the
1984 legislature in June 1985.111 Thereafter, the certification procedure appeared
on the November 1985 ballot and the voters ratified it on November 4, 1985. 314
2. Judicial Establishment of the New York Certification Procedure
The New York Constitution permits amendments to it to detail the require-
ments for utilization of the new provision.3 5 Instead of following this path with
the certification procedure, however, the Assembly followed the recommendation
another state, which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying
court and which in the opinion of the certifying court are not controlled by precedent
in the decisions of the courts of New York.
Id.
346. Compare A10676(b) with A2229.
347. Id.
348. Compare A10676(b) ("there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the court of
appeals of New York") with A2229 ("are not controlled by precedent in the decisions of the courts
of New York").
349. See supra note 344 (providing legislative history).
350. Letter from Sol Wachtler, Judge, New York Court of Appeals, to Gordon Howe, 11,
Assistant Counsel to Senate Majority Leader (Apr. 27, 1984).
351. See supra note 344 (providing legislative history of certification statute).
352. N.Y. CoNsT. art. V, § 2 (1985) (requiring constitutional amendments to be passed by two
separately elected legislatures before submission for voter approval).
353. See supra note 344 (providing legislative history).
354. The Secretary of State received the amendment to coordinate it for the ballot. Those
consulted in Assemblyman Griffith's office and at the New York Law Revision Commission were
confident that the amendment would be approved by the voters, since constitutional amendments
usually are accepted. Telephone interview with Terrence O'Neill, Counsel to Assemblyman Edward
Griffith (June 21, 1984); Telephone interview with Jay Cox O'Brien, Assistant Director, New York
Law Revision Commission (June 11, 1985).
355. N.Y. CoNsT. art. V, § 2 (1985).
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of the Law Revision Commission35 6 and, in the constitutional amendment, au-
thorized the Court of Appeals "to set forth the mechanics and provisions for
regulating the invocation of the certification procedure."3 7 The Commission
recommended this process at the behest of the Court of Appeals, which requested
the power to establish its own rules regarding the selection of certified questions." 8
Following passage of the constitutional amendment, the Court of Appeals
exercised its rulemaking power and promulgated Rule 500.17 of the New York
Rules of Court.3"9 The rule reflects the same "procedural" provisions of the
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act.m°
B. A Comparison of New York's Certification Procedure and the Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act
The substantive elements of New York's certification procedure both parallel
and deviate from the corresponding elements of the U.L.A. Specifically, New
York's power-to-answer provision follows the power-to-answer section of the
U.L.A. Rule 500.17(a) also tracks the other sections of the Act. Importantly,
however, the New York rule omits the equivalent of U.L.A. Section 8, on the
power to certify. The two certification procedures also differ on the standard
used for determining whether certification is appropriate and which courts can
certify to the Court of Appeals. The following sections discuss these differences.
1. New York Standard for Certification
The language of the relevant New York standard reads: "questions of New
York law certified to [the Court of Appeals] . . . which are not controlled by
precedent in the decisions of the courts of New York. ' 361 The Assembly presum-
ably chose this language to ensure that resort to certification occurred only in
situations that raised genuinely perplexing questions of New York law.36 Further,
the Law Revision Commission had stated that this language appeared in the
U.L.A. 36 In actuality, however, the language of the U.L.A. was a bit different:
"no controlling precedent in the decisions of the [Supreme Court] [and the
intermediate appellate courts] of this state." '13"
A comparison of the New York statute and the U.L.A. indicates that New
York's standard may allow the Court of Appeals greater flexibility to reject cases
certified to it,363 for it may be read to include the decisions of New York trial
356. Law Revision Commission Memorandum, supra note 332, at 10.
357. A2229, supra note 345 (identical text to A8860).
358. Law Revision Commission Memorandum, supra note 332, at 10.
359. N.Y. RULEs OF COURT § 500.17 (N.Y. Ct. App.) (McKinney rev. ed. 1986).
360. Compare id. (setting forth procedure and standards for certification to New York courts)
with Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 4, 12 U.L.A. 54 (1967) (outlining proposed
procedure and standards for certification).
361. S3620, 1985-1986 Regular Session (1985). Originally, the proposed statutory language more
closely followed that of the U.L.A., reading: "not controlled by precedent in the decisions of the
Court of Appeals of New York." A10676 (1984). Legislative records provide no reason for this
change in language.
362. Law Revision Commission Memorandum, supra note 332, at 10.
363. Id. at 11.
364. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § I, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
365. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (explaining that Commission was concerned that
enacting states would be fearful of overburdened dockets).
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courts, as well as appellate courts. Beyond the language difference, a review of
the short history of the New York statute discloses that the Court of Appeals
rejected more than half of the questions it received, no doubt indicating the
intention to retain flexibility in accepting or rejecting certified questions. 3" In at
least one instance the court refused to answer a question certified by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit because the same issue was
simultaneously before a New York trial court, and would soon be subject to
appeal.367
The New York Court of Appeals also adopted the strict certification standard
requiring that "determinative questions of New York law [be] involved,'' 3" in
another departure from the more liberal U.L.A. language that the "law of this
state . . . may be determinative." 3 69 These two instances of cautious language in
the New York procedure appear to serve a duplicative purpose, since the state
also adopted that portion of U.L.A. Section 1 that allows the answering court
full discretion to accept, modify, or reject certified questions of law.3 70 The fact
that New York adopted the narrower certification standard may indicate that the
court and legislature believed that the restrictive language not only would temper
the type of questions certified, but also would restrict the number of questions
that will actually be sent. Out of concern for its caseload, the Court of Appeals
may have implemented this stricter standard because it did not want to expend
the time needed even to reject certified questions.
The stringent New York standard compels certifying courts to look at
reported New York trial-court decisions, in addition to those of various appellate
courts in New York, before deciding whether to certify. This difference in
language was intentional, and in practice affects the acceptance and rejection
rates of certified questions.3 7' Therefore, certifying courts must review all New
York court decisions and, to be able to certify, must demonstrate that there is
either an absence of precedent, or a conflict among decisions, in the New York
courts .372
2. Certifying Courts
Another aspect of the New York procedure that narrows the U.L.A. stems
from the allowance of only federal appellate courts and the state courts of last
366. The court has accepted only two certified questions. Loengard v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 507
N.E.2d 315 (N.Y. 1987); Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., Inc., 502 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1986), submitted after
certification, 808 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1987).
367. Rufino v. United States, 506 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1987).
368. N.Y. RuI.Es OF COURT § 500.17(a) (N.Y. Ct. App.) (McKinney rev. ed. 1986).
369. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A, 52 (1967) (emphasis added).
370. Id.; see supra notes 99-127 and accompanying text (setting forth Section 1 of U.L.A. and
discussing power to answer, reject, and modify certified questions under this provision as reaction
to fear by states of overburdened dockets).
371. Telephone interview with Terrence O'Neill, Counsel to Assemblyman Edward Griffith (June
21, 1984); Telephone interview with Jay Cox O'Brien, Assistant Director, New York Law Revision
Commission (June. 11, 1985). Professor Vestal maintained that, based on United States Supreme
Court decisions, in no event would reported trial-court decisions be binding on a federal court in an
Erie case. Transcript of 1967, supra note 19, at 49. If this were the case, then New York's language
would have no practical difference; however, other Commissioners disagreed with Professor Vestal's
interpretation of the Supreme Court's precedent on this issue. See id. at 49-50.
372. Telephone interview with Terrence O'Neill, Counsel to Assemblyman Edward Griffith (June
21, 1984); Telephone interview with Jay Cox O'Brien, Assistant Director, New York Law Revision
Commission (June 11, 1985).
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resort to certify questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals. 73 The
U.L.A. also permits certification from federal district courts and intermediate
appellate courts of certifying states.3 74 The New York Law Revision Commission
echoed the standard fear-of-deluge rationale for rejecting the idea of certification
from those courts.37 Conventional wisdom states that questions of New York
law arise in federal courts more often than those of probably any other state.
3 76
Further, a movement recently arose within the New York Court of Appeals to
restrict rather than to expand its jurisdiction, and thereby reduce its already
overwhelming caseload. 377 The narrower language of the New York certification
statute potentially deters the burdening of the Court of Appeals with federal-
court certifications. Judging from the number of questions received, however,
imminent inundation seems unlikely.378 Since 1985, when New York enacted its
law, the federal courts have sent approximately half a dozen certified questions
to the New York Court of Appeals.
379
However, the original language of bill A10676 - the first interjurisdictional-
certification bill - allowed for three-judge district courts to certify questions.
380
The bill rationalized this approach by noting that these district courts include at
least one federal appellate judge who may be unfamiliar with state law or at
least less familiar with it than a federal district judge (who is usually a member
of the bar of the state in which the court sits)."' 1 In addition, these three-judge
373. N.Y. RuLEs OF COURT § 500.17 (N.Y. Ct. App.) (McKinney rev. ed. 1986).
374. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
375. Law Revision Commission Memorandum, supra note 332, at 11; see also Lillich, supra note
332, at 17.
376. Law Revision Commission Memorandum, supra note 332, at 11; see also Lillich, supra note
332, at 17. Although New York may have the potential to receive more certified questions than many
other states due to sheer volume, the numbers are by no means geometric in proportion. New York,
like most other states that have enacted a certification statute modeled after the U.L.A., has failed
to note that the number of questions received turns not on the size or importance of the jurisdiction,
but instead on the number of issues of a particular state's law for which there exists no controlling
precedent and for which the issue is in some degree related to or determinative of the case. Assuming
arguendo that New York would have more unanswered issues of law due to the size and volume of
law decided by the state, it does not follow that the number of issues left undecided in one state
would be significantly greater than that of any other state. In fact, the contrary may be true. New
York's litigation docket may lead to the answering of more questions than in smaller states and,
therefore, controlling precedent may exist for more issues.
377. Telephone interview with Jay Cox O'Brien, Assistant Director, New York Law Revision
Commission (June 5, 1985).
378. Miner, supra note 86, at 156-58 (asserting that federal-court deference to state courts required
the balancing of a number of factors).
The scale is "heavily weighted in favor" of the federal court's exercise of jurisdiction. Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 16 (1983). In addition, the federal courts
have expressed a desire to make diversity discretionary; more limited application of diversity juris-
diction could substantially limit the number of cases in which certified questions are necessary. See,
e.g., Carl McGowan, The View from an Inferior Court, 19 SAN Dm_,o L. PEv. 659, 665-66 (1982).
The federal courts could be empowered to abstain in diversity cases if workable state remedies exist.
See National Legal Center for the Public Interest, Abolition of Diversity Jurisdiction: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come?, xiii n.2 (1983). Modifications to or limitations on diversity jurisdiction would
obviously limit the number of certified questions sent, because in many instances the state and not
the federal court would be the forum. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988) (increasing jurisdictional
amount in diversity cases from $10,000 to $50,000).
379. Telephone interview with Kenneth Roe, Clerk, New York Court of Appeals (Feb. 1989).
380. Bill No. A10676-b (1982).
381. Memorandum, Bill 10676-b, supra note 339, at 2.
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district courts possess rather limited jurisdiction, so a lower number of potential
certified issues would arise.382 Why New York eliminated this three-judge district
court provision remains unknown, although perhaps it was necessary to acquire
the support of the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, at first bill 10676 refused to allow for any state courts to
certify questions.3"3 The Assembly then changed this provision to allow "appellate
courts of another state" to certify, but retreated from that broad language to
the final version permitting just the "appellate court of last resort" of the state
to certify. 3s4 Again, the fear of deluge reared its baseless head.",
3. Absence of Provision Allowing the New York Court of Appeals to Certify
to Other States
The amendment to the New York Constitution allowing certification failed
to authorize the New York courts to certify questions to other states, and thus
requires a future amendment to provide the state with the full powers of
certification. This omission may have resulted from an oversight.3 6 But New
York became the third state38' that has chosen to receive questions of law from
other states but not to certify them.3 8 Thus, the New York courts must continue
to guess at the law of another state when called upon to apply that unsettled
law in a given factual setting.38 9
C. Connecticut and the Dilemmas Facing an Enacting State
Previous sections of this article have reviewed the basic foundation of the
U.L.A. and the ensuing state-modified versions. The New York experience
indicated a cumbersome process of enactment, required by that state's constitu-
tion. Another highly important aspect of the certification dilemma stems from
the problems and concerns faced by states enacting such procedures. An exami-
nation of the certification debate in Connecticut evinces the two most prevalent
fears of enacting states: inundation and delay. (Of course, adopting jurisdictions
382. Id.
383. Bill No. A10676-b (1982).
384. See supra notes 331 & 344 (tracking this change, but noting no reason for it in legislative
history).
385. Law Revision Commission Memorandum, supra note 332, at 11. But see Telephone interview
with Terrence O'Neill, Counsel to Assemblyman Edward Griffith (June 21, 1984) (stating that bill
was altered "to ensure that the Court of Appeals be reserved for only weighty and important
matters"); Telephone interview with Jay Cox O'Brien, Assistant Director, New York Law Revision
Commission (June 11, 1985) (stating that egotism of Court of Appeals, not wanting to bother with
lower courts of other states, may have influenced the decision).
386. Telephone interview with Terrence O'Neill, Counsel to Assemblyman Edward Griffith (June
21, 1984); Telephone interview with Jay Cox O'Brien, Assistant Director, New York Law Revision
Commission (June 11, 1985). Mr. O'Brien stated that the L.R.C. had not been asked by anyone to
include such a provision, and that the Lillich study, which provided the basis for the committee's
research, focused on federal-to-state certification and Florida Appellate Rule 4.61 (having no interstate-
certification power). Id. But cf. Telephone interview with Joseph Bellacosa, Clerk, New York Court
of Appeals (Aug. 15, 1985) (suggesting that state probably did not want to bother with certifying
questions and preferred to decide issues itself).
387. The other states are Alabama and Michigan. See supra note 309.
388. See supra note 288 and accompanying text (noting which states lack power to certify).
389. See supra notes 234-48 and accompanying text (stating that danger of lack of power to
certify is forced judicial guesswork, in addition to lack of comity and inability of states to control
development of own law).
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do discuss other concerns, such as administrative costs, judicial economy, and
worry about the weight given to an answering court's opinion. 93 )
Connecticut represents the general anxiety of all state legislators when con-
fronted with the question of adopting certification procedures.39' Extensive leg-
islative history in that state documents those issues that caused some legislators
to be opposed to the enactment of the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act.392 Ultimately, a version of the U.L.A. was enacted in 1985 allowing
federal, but not state, courts to certify questions of law to the Connecticut
Supreme Court. 93
The Connecticut legislators who opposed the U.L.A. raised five concerns about
the certification process - two substantive and three procedural. The procedural
questions, discussed later, involved whether the opinion given was advisory, how
much respect the certifying court would accord the answering court's opinion, and
which state's laws would govern the procedure of the action. The substantive
concerns stemmed from fears of inundation and delay.
The legislature's primary substantive concern dealt with the possibility of an
undue burden on the Connecticut Supreme Court from an inordinate number of
questions certified by federal courts. 94 Connecticut, like its certification-statute-
enacting predecessors, 9 worried about the U.L.A. overtaxing its already con-
gested Supreme Court docket, thus thwarting that court's ability to carry out its
normal duties.39 Federal Judges Jon 0. Newman, of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, and T.F. Gilroy Daly, of the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, rebutted these opponents of
certification. Judge Newman testified in state judiciary-committee hearings as a
proponent of the U.L.A.,3 9 7 stating that the fear of a flood of litigation was not
justified, for two reasons. First, the U.L.A. nowhere requires that the answering
court respond to certified questions 98 Indeed, the Act leaves responding courts
free to decline any question submitted, thereby retaining control over their
dockets. 399 Second, Judge Newman noted that the experience of states with a
certification procedure already in place reveals only a small quantity of certified
questions.VO Judge Newman's assessment proved correct; since Connecticut en-
390. See supra notes 283-316 and accompanying text (outlining different types of statutes enacted
in various states and concerns raised during course of enactment).
391. Id.
392. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199a (West 1985) (Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act) [hereinafter Connecticut U.L.A.].
393. Connecticut U.L.A. § 51-199a(b).
394. See Hearings on H.B. 6249, supra note 81, at 368.
395. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text (discussing states' fear of deluge prior to
enactment of certification statutes, but concluding that such fear was groundless).
396. Hearings on H.B. 6249, supra note 81, at 370.
397. Id. at 363-64, 370.
398. Id. at 363. See generally Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act §§ 1-13, 12 U.L.A.
52-56 (1967) (failing to require answering courts to respond to certified questions and providing
several avenues to avoid responding, including requirement of no controlling precedent and require-
ment that opinion issued to certified question must be determinative of action).
399. Hearings on H.B. 6249, supra note 81, at 363.
400. Id. at 364.
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acted its certification statute it has received only a handful of certified questions.' °0
The second substantive issue raised by the legislators emanated from the
belief that certification leads to unreasonable delay in case resolution, 40 2 mirroring
other states' concerns prior to U.L.A. passage. 43 Judge Newman explained that
case history disproves this notion. He reported that, on average, only three
months elapsed from time of receipt, to time of answer, and then to final
disposition of the federal portion of the lawsuit. 45 Judge Newman also informed
the committee that the Supreme Court likely would handle certified matters
expeditiously in the interest of comity and because of the low number of
requests.40 Judge Daly also testified on this issue, stating his belief that certifi-
cation rarely caused undue delays or significant financial or administrative burdens
on litigants.4 Research has disclosed no reports of delays due to certification in
the years since enactment of the U.L.A. in Connecticut.'
The three procedural concerns that were raised in committee were treated
rather expeditiously. The first related to the potentially advisory nature of the
opinion answering the certified question, and, therefore, its constitutionality,.4
again echoing a concern of other enacting states. 410 Judge Newman demonstrated
the nonadvisory nature of the procedure by noting the requirement that certifi-
cation occur only during a real lawsuit between real parties.
41
1
Connecticut legislators also considered the procedural matter of the binding
nature of the answer on the certifying court, 4 2 an outgrowth of the advisory-
opinion debate. Judge Newman assured the legislators of the obligation of federal
courts to accept Connecticut Supreme Court rulings on certified questions, just
as on reported opinions. 413 Indeed, the answer serves as binding precedent and
is res judicata regarding the parties, thus distinguishing the answer to a certified
question from a mere advisory opinion.
41 4
Finally, the legislators were uneasy about the possibility of the answering
court losing control over the procedure once the case reached it.41 1 One legislator
401. I have done a Lexis search of the States Library, Connecticut file, using the search term
"certif! w/seg (question law)" and a Westlaw search of the Connecticut cases database using as a
search term "opinion (certif! & "question law")".
402. Hearings on H.B. 6249, supra note 81, at 364.
403. See generally supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text (discussing belief that certification
delays case resolution due to time involved in awaiting answering court's response and potential for
further proceedings in answering court).
404. Hearings on H.B. 6249, supra note 81, at 363, 368.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 370.
407. Id. at 372.
408. A search of the Westlaw and Lexis Connecticut databases revealed no mention of reported
delays in litigation involving questions certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
409. Hearings on H.B. 6249, supra note 81, at 367-68.
410. See supra notes 168-69 (noting Maine Supreme Judicial Court's view on possible advisory
nature of certification and its conclusion that Maine will not answer certified question unless answer
will be determinative of case).
411. Hearings on H.B. 6249, supra note 81, at 366. Representative Michael Ryback raised this
concern again on the House floor, but never seriously challenged the Bill.
412. Id. at 368.
413. Id. at 367.
414. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text (relating binding nature of opinion answering
certified question).
415. Hearings on H.B. 6249, supra note 81, at 373-74.
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responded that such proceedings must be determined and controlled by the
Connecticut Supreme Court, pursuant to the Connecticut rules of procedure.4 1 6
This view carried the day, with the legislature following the example of other
states that have enacted the U.L.A., by allowing the answering court to control
procedures.4 17 Thus, Connecticut entered the age of certification, with some
variations from the U.L.A.
As illustrated by the examples of New York and Connecticut, enacting a
certification procedure requires strict attention both to the individual state's
constitution and to the concerns of state officials, including both legislators and
judges. Fortunately, most state adoptions of certification have met with little
resistance in the final analysis, but obtaining the goal of a certification procedure
still takes time. State legislatures, like state courts, also face crowded schedules
with many pressing issues to consider. Certification should certainly be a major
concern of these individuals, however, because the ability to certify and answer
questions greatly aids the state's ability to control and monitor the laws that
those legislators work so hard to enact.
VII. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF
QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT
Establishing the U.L.A. aided greatly in promoting enactment of certification
statutes and court rules in forty jurisdictions, 4 s twelve of which also adopted
interstate-certification provisions. 4 9 Still, the certification procedure suffers from
gross underutilization, particularly in the interstate context.?2 The question, then,
now becomes: Why this failure to employ certification more extensively?
As this article attempts to demonstrate, the lack of use stems from ignorance
regarding the values of certification (particularly with respect to solving difficult
conflict-of-laws questions), the U.L.A.'s optional language on interstate certifi-
cation 4 2' and the variation and inconsistency among the states that permit the
process.4 By its very nature the certification process demands interaction between
courts, and thus fails without uniformity. In order to promote the use of
certification, provisions must be efficient and easily applied. Courts need to feel
a sense of comity, which only stems from confidence that other jurisdictions with
whom they interact operate under the same strictures. Consequently, the current
416. Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 1985 Conn. Gen. Assembly Proceedings
(daily ed. Apr. 18, 1985), at 2935 (statement of Rep. Frankel).
417. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (noting that answering courts control process
once question reaches them). See also CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199a(g) (1985). The House
approved the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, via House Bill No. 6249, on April 18,
1985, by a vote of 136-9. Six days later, the Senate, without discussion, passed House Bill 6249, and
the Bill took effect on October 1, 1985.
418. See infra Appendix part B.
419. See supra note 286 (listing jurisdictions that allow interstate certification).
420. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (stating that no instances of interstate certification
have been reported in the history of the procedure).
421. See supra notes 144-48 & 234-48 and accompanying text (noting that the U.L.A. brackets
language on interstate certification, making its adoption by states optional in order to encourage
enactment by state legislatures in the face of fears of deluge and delay).
422. See supra notes 283-316 and accompanying text (describing variations among state statutes,
including different standards for accepting certification and permissibility of interstate certification).
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multi-procedure approach of disjointed processes following the U.L.A. theme
and variations discourages the use of certification.
In the remainder of this article, therefore, I propose uniform legislation
designed to overcome these deficiencies and thereby advance the use of certifi-
cation. The proposal mandates all provisions and, to be of greatest value, should
be adopted in the form presented at the conclusion of this article. The language
suggested in the discussion section presents examples to advance the conceptual
relationship of the final provisions of the certification proposal.
A. Method of Enactment
States enact a certification process either by statute or court rule.42 1 States
that require a statute may adopt this proposed language as a uniform entity.
424
Some states require that the state constitution be amended in order to expand
the jurisdiction of the state's highest appellate court, thereby including certifi-
cation within its powers. 45 The state constitution could also be amended to
permit the highest state appellate court to enact its own rules, thus allowing that
court to incorporate this proposed language into its already-existing rules. No
matter which vehicle the state chooses, it may enact certification.
B. Power to Answer
The U.L.A. permits not only the highest court of a state to receive and
respond to certified questions, but also provides discretion for use of this power
by intermediate appellate courts.42 This power-to-answer provision requires mod-
ification to prohibit intermediate state appellate courts from answering certified
questions of state law. Allowing these intermediate courts to answer promotes
inefficiency, because the highest court maintains appellate jurisdiction to reverse
any determination on appeal. 427 An appeal to the higher state appeals court
creates unjustified delay in the certification process. 42 Moreover, the highest
court in the state, as the final arbiter of state law, is best equipped to address
questions of first impression.429
The absolute power to answer by the highest state court affords exclusive
discretion to the answering court to receive and respond to a certified question. 4"
The provision allows self-policing and protects an answering court from inun-
dation, irrelevant questions, and answering matters outside its jurisdiction or
423. See supra notes 259-82 and accompanying text (outlining two methods of adopting certifi-
cation).
424. See supra notes 390-417 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of certification statute
in Connecticut).
425. See supra notes 328-60 and accompanying text (describing New York experience amending
constitution to provide court jurisdiction over certified questions).
426. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967); see supra notes 40-
54 and accompanying text (discussing Section 1 of the U.L.A.).
427. See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text (discussing problems with U.L.A., specifically
when questions are answered by intermediate appellate courts).
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (noting that certification to lower courts inhibits
final determinations of law and that availability of such a forum allows certifying courts to choose
where to certify questions).
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currently pending in lower state courts. 43' Of utmost importance, the answering
court need not provide artificial reasons to avoid responding.
432
Recommended provision:
The [Supreme Court4 13 ] may answer questions of law certified to it by the
Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States,
a United States District Court, or the highest appellate court of any other state
or the District of Columbia.
C. Which Courts May Certify
The U.L.A. makes certification available to the Supreme Court of the United
States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, or a United States District
Court. 4 4 The Commissioners intended that this language be obligatory on states
adopting the U.L.A .4 1 Often, however, statutes that implement the U.L.A. restrict
certain federal courts' ability to certify. 4 6 In addition, the Commissioners left




All federal courts and the highest state appellate courts should be able to
certify questions to an answering court. Thus, the proposed uniform statute
obliges states to enact their certification statutes to permit all of the above-
mentioned courts to certify. This proposed language eliminates discretion in
statutes and rules in the implementation of certification procedures. It furthers
the goals of comity and reduction of judicial conjecture, and, significantly, retains
the appropriate state court as the final arbiter and controller of its own law.
Recommended provision:
A question of law may be certified by an order of the Supreme Court of
the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a United States
District Court, or the highest appellate court of any state or the District of
Columbia, upon the court's own motion or upon the motion of any party to the
cause.
This section, in conjunction with the previous one, removes the concern of
an appeal in both the state-to-state and the federal-to-state context. Only the
431. See supra notes 108-31 and accompanying text (noting discretion permitted to answering
courts under U.L.A. and advantages that such discretion provides).
432. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (discussing merits of absolute discretion resting
with answering court).
433. This term is bracketed, for the jurisdiction to substitute the title of its highest appellate
court. See supra note 100.
434. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
435. Id. The Commissioners denoted optional language with brackets. Id. Commissioners' com-
ment, 12 U.L.A. 52-53 (1975).
436. Illinois only allows certification from the United States Supreme Court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, presumably to prevent deluge. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A,
para. 20 (Smith-Hurd 1983). Delaware only allows certification from the United States District Court
for.the District of Delaware. DEL. Sup. CT. R. 41 (1987). Delaware is the most cautious in delegating
which jurisdiction may certify to its court, probably believing that only the Delaware federal district
court is in a position to recognize and formulate certified questions to the Delaware Supreme Court.
One must wonder, however, why such recognition was not also given to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
437. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967). Bracketed language
indicates permissive suggestions in the U.L.A. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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highest state court may prepare or answer certified questions, eliminating the
possibility of appeal present if a lower state court poses or answers a question. 438
On the federal-to-state level the answer of the state's highest court binds all
federal courts, and thus cannot be overturned even if an appeal occurs in the
federal case.
43 9
This proposal gives the district courts certification power, as they hear the
bulk of the diversity cases. In the federal context, the district courts are most
attuned to which questions need to be certified to resolve consistently arising
questions of state law. These courts possess equal capabilities with the federal
appellate courts to ascertain the clarity of state laws." 0 Thus, state statutes and
rules disallowing federal district courts to send certified questions are unjustified
and unwise.
D. Reciprocity Requirement
In conjunction with the power to answer and the power to certify, this
proposal mandates a reciprocity requirement. All of the jurisdictions that accept
certified questions must also be empowered to certify questions. The reciprocity
requirement seeks to attain uniformity and to assure all participating states of
like treatment. This equality breeds confidence in the identity of their powers
and responsibilities, thus making them more amenable to certifying questions
when necessary. The tenets of comity and trust must be exercised through
reciprocity for the successful utilization of the certification process. Uniform
reciprocity assures a state that some balance will be achieved by discouraging
courts from only utilizing one of the powers of certification for fear of inundation,
delay, or loss of control."' The heart of certification rests on the interactive
process, requiring participating jurisdictions to both answer and certify.
Recommended provision:
This jurisdiction, having the power to certify questions of law, is empowered
to accept certified questions from all jurisdictions having the power to certify.
E. When the State Court May Answer
The state court should respond to a certified question when the issue
concerning its law may be determinative of the case. The "may be determinative"
language set forth in Section 1 " 2 comports with the notions of uniformity and
ease of application of the proposed language." 3 Many jurisdictions, however,
adopted statutes containing the too restrictive "must be determinative" stan-
438. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (noting that all intermediate-court decisions
are subject to appeal, such that any time an intermediate court answers certified question, that
answer is subject to change on appeal).
439. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text (stating that state-court decisions of law bind
federal courts sitting in diversity).
440. See supra note 436 (noting that Delaware allows only its federal district court to send
certified questions to the Delaware Supreme Court).
441. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 10, at 434-44 (discussing issues of control and forum bias).
442. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967).
443. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (describing "may be determinative" standard
as one requiring merely that the state court's answer potentially resolve the case).
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dard.1" This more stringent test leads to counterproductive battles concerning
which questions should be answered. The answering and certifying courts then
become bogged down in procedural, rather than substantive, determinations. The
"must be determinative" language shackles the certifying court, placing proce-
dural locks on certification of the question when the process requires openness
in order to function properly.
The more permissive "may be determinative" language allows both the
certifying and answering courts to reach the crux of the substantive issue quickly.
The removal of artificial procedural barriers allows the answering court full
discretion to self-police. Thus, the "may be determinative" language promotes
forthright judicial decisions - the ultimate goal of the certification process.
Recommended provision:
The [Supreme Court], when sent a question by a certifying court, may answer
those questions of law that may be determinative of the cause before the certifying
court.
F. No Controlling Precedent
Some states have set forth a "no clear controlling" precedent standard,
instead of a more liberal "no controlling" standard.45 The more restrictive "no
clear controlling" language leads to the same empty procedural problems as
presented in the "must be determinative"/"may be determinative" dichotomy.
Jurisdictions that employ the "no clear controlling" language use it both to limit
the number of questions sent and to avoid answering certified questions. 46 No
discernible difference exists between the "no clear controlling" and the "no
controlling" standards, except for the manner in which courts interpret them for
their own purposes. As a practical matter, however, because statutes always
receive varying judicial interpretations, the proposed statute mandates the broader
language to avoid tortured analyses and unnecessary distinctions. (Under the new
statute, for example, a court that is faced with conflicting authority in state law
could certify, because by definition the issue would meet both the "no control-
ling" and "clear controlling" precedent tests.)
Recommended provision:
This power to certify applies to questions of law that may be determinative
of the cause then pending in the certifying court and for which there is no
controlling precedent in the receiving jurisdiction.
G. Preferential Treatment for Certified Questions
Certified questions should have a preferred status on the answering court's
docket, to encourage prompt response and to assure an answer as soon as
444. See supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text (noting that certain states adopted stricter
standard, which purportedly could be used to stop flow of certified questions).
445. See supra notes 303-08 and accompanying text (discussing difference between two standards
in that no clear controlling precedent mandates that certifying court must not find any case that
assists in decision).
446. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text (relating this standard as means of avoiding
certification by simply holding that question presented fails this test).
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practicable. Such a statutory directive remedies the problem of delay." 7 The
provision must not mandate preferential treatment of certified questions, however,
to maintain discretion on the part of the answering court.4"
Broad language allows the answering court to control its docket, yet is
forceful enough to induce the answering and certifying courts to respect one
another's needs reciprocally. This provision encourages courts to respond quickly
so that the reverse situation will result in an equally prompt answer. Keeping in
mind the magnitude of the courts' dockets and the burden on the courts, the
"as soon as practicable" standard is a good compromise, leaving each court free
to determine its own schedule. If a court fails to respond within a reasonable
time, other courts may apply appropriate pressure, noting their dissatisfaction.
Recommended provision:
The [Supreme Court] shall respond to certified questions as soon as practi-
cable, comporting with notions of comity and fairness.
H. Method of Invoking Certification
Under this proposal, a court would invoke certification upon its own motion
or that of the litigants when the court deems it necessary. The certifying judge
would ultimately control whether the question will be certified and sent. This
method ensures that certification will be employed only when the certifying court
believes that it is important to do so.
Recommended provision:
A question of law may be certified by an order of any of the courts referred
to in Section 1 upon the court's own motion or upon the successful motion of
any party to the cause.
I. Contents of Certification Order
The discussion above with respect to the content of a certification order
applies equally for the proposed statutory language."49 The proposed statute
includes subsection 3 to clarify who controls the statement of facts sent to the
answering court. This addition avoids delay in sending the question to the
answering court by making the certifying court the master of the schedule.
Recommended provision:
A certification order shall set forth: (1) the question(s) of law to be answered;
and (2) a statement of all facts relevant to the question(s) certified and showing
fully the nature of the controversy in which the question(s) arose. If the parties
cannot agree upon a joint statement of facts, the certifying court must make this
determination.
447. Delay in answering is one of the more prominent concerns of the opponents of the certification
process. See Hearings on H.B. 6649, supra note 81, at 363, 368 (noting that, in debate over
certification in Connecticut Legislature, major concern was delay).
448. Miner, supra note 86, at 155-58 (noting tensions between state- and federal-court systems in
diversity cases).
449. See supra notes 196-218 and accompanying text (relating that current method allows the
certifying court to determine need for certification and to control fact statement sent to answering
court).
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J. Unaltered U.L.A. Language
The U.L.A. contains a great deal of language that fits well when incorporated
into this proposal. As articulated throughout this article, the problems with the
U.L.A. stem from lack of uniformity and nonrestrictive language, rather than
from problems with the fundamental premises underlying the statute.
The sections of the U.L.A. concerning the preparation of a certification
order,450 the costs of certification, 4 ' briefs and arguments, 45 2 and opinion, 4"3 aptly
delineate effective language for my legislative proposal. Sections 10 through 13
provide standard provisions for most uniform laws and thus require no altera-
tion.45 4 The U.L.A. analysis previously detailed articulates the validity of this
language.
455
K. Interstate Certification - Power to Certify
Many existing certification statutes relegate interstate certification to optional
or nonexistent status. My proposal emphasizes the importance of certification in
the interstate context by mandating its adoption. It is imperative for states to
enact and utilize interstate certification, in order to maximize the rewards of the
certification process. Interstate use can effectively remove judicial speculation in
conflict-of-laws situations, just as federal-to-state certification can resolve Erie
problems. 45 6 In addition, interstate certification can promote judicial economy
and timely responses.
457
When a state court employs various devices to determine another state's law,
the resulting decision can be considered precedent that is binding on future
litigants, even though the proper court never ruled on the issue. Thus, adversity
can arise because an outside court lacks the requisite knowledge or insight required
to assess the possible ramifications or impact of the decision. Certification in
this context can produce honest judicial opinions. 45 When the appropriate state's
highest court responds to a certified question, this process assures litigants of
application of the correct statement of that state's law, whereas employing renvoi
or common conflict-of-laws escape devices is tantamount to judicial conjecture.
Recommended provision:
The [Supreme Court], on its own motion or the motion of any party to the
cause, may order certification of questions of law to the highest court of any
450. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 4, 12 U.L.A. 54 (1967).
451. Id. § 5, 12 U.L.A. 54.
452. Id. § 6, 12 U.L.A. 54.
453. Id. § 7, 12 U.L.A. 55.
454. Id. §§ 10-13, 12 U.L.A. 56.
455. See supra notes 219-33 & 250-58 and accompanying text (discussing relevant provisions of
U.L.A.).
456. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text (explaining that federal-to-state certification
eliminates Erie problems because federal courts sitting in diversity no longer need to guess at unclear
state law).
457. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (noting that interstate certification promotes
economy by giving definitive answers to unclear issues and promotes timely responses by bringing
comity into play).
458. See Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 721 (1979) (asserting
the importance of well-articulated, honest reasons in the justification for judicial decisions, particularly
in choice-of-law cases).
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other state, when it appears to the certifying court that there are involved In any
proceeding before the court questions of law of the receiving state that may be
determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and for which
there are no controlling precedents in the decisions of the highest court of the
receiving state.
VIII. CONCLUSION
By adopting the U.L.A., the Uniform Law Commissioners sought primarily
to provide a new and better alternative to solve the problems associated with the
Erie doctrine. Unfortunately, the Act's efficiency has been undermined both by
the failure of many states to adopt the Act or an equivalent procedure, and by
the disparate language that some states employ in their certification statutes.
Scant legislative history in adopting states and sparse judicial construction of the
various statutes and rules combine to make it difficult to ascertain not only the
rationale for adopting language different from the U.L.A., but also the practical
implications, if any, of that language.
The Act has had no great success as yet in aiding the resolution of conflict-
of-laws cases. The inconsistency of statutory language among the states has
rendered interjurisdictional certification almost impotent. The decision of the
U.L.A. Commissioners to make adoption of interstate certification optional
unfortunately contributed to the failure of more than half of the states with
U.L.A.-like certification procedures to provide for interstate certification. Until
all states provide for such certification, however, the full panoply of benefits
that certification offers remains beyond the reach of courts and litigants facing
conflict-of-laws situations.
It is imperative that the U.L.A. proposed by this article be brought to the
attention of the legislators and state officials who have the influence to make
adoption of the Act a reality in their jurisdictions. The uniformity of the proposal
overcomes the problems that the U.L.A. itself does not address. Further, the
value of certification for conflict-of-laws cases must be particularly emphasized,
since many states that currently have certification procedures need to be aware
of the enhanced values that interstate certification can provide. The proposed
certification procedure effectuates the full force of uniformity, ease of application,




A. Summary of Recommended Provisions3 9
§ 1. Power to Certify
The [Supreme Court], on its own motion or the motion of any party to the
cause, may order certification of questions of law to the highest court of any
other state, when it appears to the certifying court that there are involved in any
proceeding before the court questions of law of the receiving state that may be
determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and for which
there are no controlling precedents in the decisions of the highest court of the
receiving state.
§ 2. Power to Answer
(a) The [Supreme Court] may answer questions of law certified to it by the
Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States,
a United States District Court, the United States Court of International Trade,
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the United States Claims Court,
the United States Court of Military Appeals, the United States Tax Court, or
the highest appellate court of any other state or the District of Columbia.
(b) The [Supreme Court], when sent a question by a certifying court, may
answer those questions of law that may be determinative of the cause before the
certifying court.
§ 3. Reciprocity Requirement
This jurisdiction, having the power to certify, is empowered to accept certified
questions from all jurisdictions having the power to certify.
§ 4. Preference
The [Supreme Court] shall respond to certified questions as soon as practi-
cable, comporting with notions of comity and fairness.
§ 5. Contents of Certification Order
A certification order shall set forth: (1) the question(s) of law to be answered;
and (2) a statement of all facts relevant to the question(s) certified and showing
fully the nature of the controversy in which the question(s) arose. If the parties
cannot agree upon a joint statement of facts, the certifying court must make this
determination.
§ 6. Preparation of Certification Order
The certification order shall be prepared by the certifying court, signed by
the judge presiding at the hearing, and forwarded to the [Supreme Court] by the
clerk of the certifying court under its official seal. The [Supreme Court] may
require the original or copies of all or of any portion of the record before the
certifying court to be filed with the certification order, if, in the opinion of the
[Supreme Court], the record or portion thereof may be necessary in answering
the questions.
459. In addition to summarizing the recommended provisions, I have also integrated satisfactory
unaltered provisions of the U.L.A. Moreover, I have included in proposed Section 2 (Power to
Answer) several courts that were added to the U.L.A.'s power-to-answer provision in a 1990
amendment. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 20 (Supp. 1991). This
was the only change made by the 1990 amendment.
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§ 7. Costs of Certification
Fees and costs shall be the same as in [civil appeals] docketed before the
[Supreme Court] and shall be equally divided between the parties unless otherwise
ordered by the certifying court in its order of certification.
§ 8. Procedures for Certification
The procedures for certification from this state to the receiving state shall
be those provided in the laws of the receiving state.
§ 9. Opinion
The written opinion of the [Supreme Court] stating the law governing the
question(s) certified shall be sent by the clerk under the seal of the [Supreme
Court] to the certifying court and to the parties.
§ 10. Power to Amend the Question
The receiving court shall have the ability to reshape or reformulate the issues
presented in the certificate. Certifying courts will explicitly allow the receiving
court to do so in the certificate.
§ 11. Severability
If any provision of the [Act] [Rule] or the application thereof to any person,
court, or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other
provisions or applications of the [Act] [Rule] that can be given effect without
the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this [Act]
[Rule] are severable.
§ 12. Construction
This [Act] [Rule] shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the law of those jurisdictions that enact it.
§ 13. Short Title
This [Act] [Rule] may be cited as the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law [Act] [Rule].
§ 14. Time of Taking Effect
This [Act] [Rule] shall take effect
B. Certification Procedures in United States Jurisdictions
1. Alabama: ALA. JuDIciAL ART. § 6.02(b)(3) (1982) (ALA. CONST. art. VI, §
140(b)(3);' ALA. R. App. P. 18.
2. Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1861 to 12-1867 (Cum. Supp. 1988)
(enacted by 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws 111, § 1).
3. Colorado: CoLo. App. R. 21.1 (amended by COLO. App. R. 11.01 (1975))
(CoLo. REv. STAT., Vol. 78).
4. Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199a (West Supp. 1989) (enacted
by 1985 Conn. Pub. Acts 85-111, §§ 1-9).
5. Delaware: DEL. Sup. CT. R. 41 (amended 1987).
6. District of Columbia: D.C. CODE § 11-723 (1981).
7. Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1988); FLA. App. R. 9.150 (amending
Rules 9.510 and 4.61); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6).
8. Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-9 (1985) (enacted by GA. CODE § 24-3902);
GA. App. R. 42.
9. Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 602-5(2) (1985) (amending HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 602-5 (1968)) (enacted by 1955 Haw. Rev. Sess. Laws ch. 214, §§ 26, 27, as
amended by 1965 Haw. Rev. Sess. Act 8).
10. Idaho: IDAHO App. R. 12.1.
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11. Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 20 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
12. Indiana: IND. CODE, § 33-2-4-1 (Burns 1985) (enacted by 1971 Ind. Acts
426); IND. App. R. 15(N) (1976) (amending Rulel5(O)).
13. Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 684A.1 to 684A.11 (West 1987) (enacted by 1979
Iowa Acts 294); IOWA R. App. P. 451-61.
14. Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3201 to 60-3212 (1987) (enacted by 1979
Kan. Sess. Laws 181).
15. Kentucky: Ky. R. Crv. P. 76.37 (1978).
16. Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:72.1 (West 1983) (enacted by 1972 La.
Acts 84); LA. SuP. CT. R. 12.
17. Maine: ME. REV. STAT., tit. 4, § 57 (1989) (amending, tit. 4, § 57 (1964));
ME. R. Civ. P. 76B.
18. Maryland: MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to 12-609 (1984).
19. Massachusetts: MAss. Sup. JuD. CT. R. 1:03 (amending MASS. Sup. JuD.
CT. R. 3:21).
20. Michigan: MICH. GEN. CT. R. 797-2 (1976).
21. Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061 (West Supp. 1989).
22. Mississippi: Miss. Sup. Ct. R. 20.
23. Missouri: Mo. CODE ANN. § 477.004 (West Supp. 1990); see Jones Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co., No. 72650 (finding lack of constitutional
jurisdiction for supreme court to answer certified questions).
24. Montana: MONT. R. App. P. 44; see also Irion v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 461
P.2d 199 (Mont. 1969).
25. Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 2.120 (1987); NEV. R. App. P. 5.
26. New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 490 (1968); N.H. SuP. CT. R. 34
(amending Rule 20 (1972) (amending Rule 21 (1968)).
27. New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-8 (1978).
28. New York: N.Y. RuLES OF COURT § 500.17 (N.Y. Ct. App.) (McKinney rev.
ed. 1986).
29. North Dakota: N.D. R. App. P. 47.
30. Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1601-1612 (West Supp. 1989).
31. Oregon: OR. REv. STAT. §§ 28.200 to 28.255 (1983).
32. Puerto Rico: P.R. SuP. CT. R. (1988).
33. Rhode Island: R.I. SuP. CT. R. 6 (1974).
34. South Carolina: S.C. SuP. CT. R. 46 (1982).
35. South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-24A-1 to 15-24A-11 (1984).
36. Texas: TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 3-c (1985) (proposed Acts 1985, 69th Leg.,
S.J.R. No. 10; approved by referendum 1985); Tex. R. App. P. 110-114.
37. Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 2.60 (1989) (enacted by 1965 Wash. Laws,
ch. 99, § 1).
38. West Virginia: W. VA. CODE §§ 51-lA-1 to 15-1A-12 (1981).
39. Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 821.01 to 821.12 (West Supp. 1989).
40. Wyoming: WYo. STAT. § 1-13-106 (1977); Wyo. R. App. P. 11.01-11.07.
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